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ABSTRACT
The United States is almost alone among nations in permitting the
execution of juvenile offenders. Citing this fact, along with a variety of
legal and historical materials, litigants and scholars are increasingly
claiming that the United States’ use of the juvenile death penalty vio-
lates international law. This Article examines the validity of this claim,
from the perspective of both the international legal system and the
U.S. legal system.
Based on a detailed examination of the United States’ interaction
with treaty regimes and international institutions since the late 1940s,
the Article concludes that the international law arguments against the
juvenile death penalty have significant weaknesses. As the Article
documents, for a number of reasons, the United States has consis-
tently declined to consent to treaty provisions restricting the juvenile
death penalty, and it has consistently declared the human rights trea-
ties that contain such restrictions to be non-self-executing. In addition,
since at least the mid-1980s, the United States has persistently objected
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to—and thereby legally opted out of—any customary international
law restriction on the juvenile death penalty.
The Article also argues that, even if the international law argu-
ments against the juvenile death penalty were more persuasive, they
would not provide a basis for relief in U.S. courts. For separation of
powers reasons, courts properly will decline to apply international law
to override the considered choices of the president and Senate in their
ratification of treaties. In addition, because of concerns relating to
both separation of powers and federalism, courts properly will decline
to apply customary international law to override state criminal pun-
ishment, especially when (as is the case here) the political branches
have expressly declined to do so by treaty. This potential gap between
evolving international law norms and U.S. judicial enforcement is less
disturbing than some commentators appear to assume—it simply
means that the juvenile death penalty issue, like other difficult issues
of social policy in the United States, must be resolved through U.S.
democratic and constitutional processes.
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INTRODUCTION
There is substantial and growing international pressure on the
United States to end or curtail its use of the death penalty. Most
European nations have abolished the death penalty, and the Euro-
pean Union has become increasingly vocal in its criticism of the U.S.
practice. For the last several years, the United Nations (UN) Com-
mission on Human Rights has adopted resolutions calling upon na-
tions to impose a moratorium on the death penalty. Many nations de-
cline to extradite criminal suspects to the United States if the suspects
will face the death penalty. And amicus curiae filings by international
organizations in U.S. death penalty cases are now becoming routine.
Those who favor restriction of the U.S. death penalty are hopeful
that this international pressure will have an effect on U.S. practice. In
this respect, they have been encouraged by a number of recent devel-
opments within the United States that may suggest that the time is
ripe for change. These developments include the softening of public
support in the United States for the death penalty;1 the moratoria on
the death penalty imposed in Illinois and Maryland (and the subse-
quent commutation of death sentences by Governor Ryan in Illi-
nois);2 the exoneration of a number of death row inmates based on
1. Gallup polls indicated that public support for the death penalty had dropped to around
65 percent in the year 2001, down from a high in 1994 of 80 percent. Jim Yardley, Number of
Executions Falls for Second Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at A24. However, public
support for the death penalty appeared to increase somewhat in late 2001 and early 2002. See
Jeffrey M. Jones, In-Depth Analysis: The Death Penalty 4, at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/analysis/ia020830iv.asp (Aug. 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
2. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Foreign Leaders Laud Move on Death Penalty in Illinois, WASH.
POST, Jan. 18, 2003, at A19; Francis X. Clines, Death Penalty Is Suspended in Maryland, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A20; Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at A1.
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DNA and other evidence;3 concerns about the death penalty ex-
pressed publicly by the Supreme Court’s sometimes swing vote, Jus-
tice O’Connor;4 and the Supreme Court’s recent decision holding that
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment.5
Even with these developments, however, it is far from clear that in-
ternational pressure will be sufficient to change U.S. practice in any
significant way. The administration of the death penalty in the United
States is largely decentralized, making nationwide change difficult to
achieve. Furthermore, there is still significant public support in this
country for capital punishment, and the recent softening of this sup-
port may not have much to do with international pressure. Indeed,
the U.S. government and populace often seem to resist (or ignore) in-
ternational pressure. The executions in 2001 of Timothy McVeigh and
Juan Raul Garza—the first federal executions since 1963,6 carried out
in the face of substantial international criticism—illustrate the con-
tinuing U.S. commitment to this form of criminal punishment.7
Perhaps as a result of the limited effects of international political
pressure, efforts are being made to convert this pressure into legal
claims that are cognizable by U.S. courts. The most significant efforts
in this regard have concerned the imposition of the death penalty on
3. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Virginia Man Is Pardoned in a Murder; DNA Is Cited, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at A20 (describing pardon of former death row inmate based on DNA evi-
dence).
4. See Justice O’Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A16 (commenting on
Justice O’Connor’s statements questioning the administration of the death penalty); O’Connor
Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A9 (same).
5. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002).
6. Death Penalty Information Ctr., Execution of Federal Prisoners 1927–2001, at http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/fedexec.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
7. See Suzanne Daley, The McVeigh Execution: The Reaction Abroad; Almost as One,
Europe Condemns Execution, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at A20; Peter Slevin & Charles Lane,
Garza Turned Down by High Court, Bush; Late Efforts to Block Execution Fail, WASH. POST,
June 19, 2001, at A3. More recently, the death penalty has been a topic of international contro-
versy with respect to U.S. efforts to obtain custody of and try individuals suspected of involve-
ment in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Lee Dembart, Death Penalty? Issue May Split
Allies, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 13, 2001, at 1; T.R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror
Suspects to U.S.; Allies Oppose Death Penalty and Bush’s Plan for Secret Military Tribunals,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A23; Philip Shenon & Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: The
20th Hijacker; France Warns It Opposes Death Penalty in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, March 28,
2002, at A14. Death penalty cases involving state breaches of the consular notice provisions of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations have also generated international friction. See,
e.g., Ginger Thompson, An Execution in Texas Strains Ties with Mexico and Others, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2002, at A6 (reporting President Vincente Fox’s decision to cancel a meeting with
President Bush after the U.S. execution of a Mexican citizen).
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individuals who commit their capital crimes while under the age of
eighteen.8 Despite arguments that juveniles are less culpable than
adults, more susceptible to rehabilitation, and less likely to be de-
terred by the death penalty, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it
does not violate the Eighth Amendment to impose the death penalty
on juvenile offenders, as long as those offenders are at least sixteen
years of age at the time of the offense.9 Currently, twenty-two of the
thirty-eight U.S. states that provide for the death penalty permit the
execution of juvenile offenders.10 Internationally, however, the num-
bers look quite different. Of the approximately 193 nations in the
world, only seven (including the United States) have executed juve-
nile offenders since 1990, and even some of these nations have re-
cently moved to eliminate the practice.11 Moreover, the other six
countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Paki-
stan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen12—are not necessarily the best of
company with respect to human rights issues.
Citing these international statistics, as well as a variety of legal
materials, juvenile offenders on death row are now challenging their
capital sentences on the ground that the juvenile death penalty vio-
lates international law. These challenges are based on both treaties as
well as “customary international law”—that is, the law of the interna-
tional community that “results from a general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”13 To date,
8. As a shorthand, I sometimes refer in this Article to the execution of individuals who
committed their offenses while under the age of eighteen as “juvenile executions” or as involv-
ing the “juvenile death penalty.” Because of the amount of time involved in adjudicating U.S.
death penalty cases, however, juvenile offenders are no longer juveniles at the time of their exe-
cution.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 46–61.
10. VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES
AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973–DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 8, at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
11. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 709–10 (3d ed. 2001); AMNESTY INT’L, CHILDREN AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
EXECUTIONS WORLDWIDE SINCE 1990, at 5–11, http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/children.
pdf (Nov. 2000) (ACT 50/10/00) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
12. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 11 at 1.
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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courts have rejected these challenges.14 Nevertheless, the issue does
not appear to be settled: Several dissenting and concurring judges in
these cases have taken the international law arguments seriously.15
Furthermore, in a case from Nevada, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
quested the views of the Solicitor General before ultimately denying
review.16 And at least two state appellate courts have issued stays of
execution in cases raising these arguments.17 There also has been sub-
stantial attention to this issue in the press, most of it sympathetic to
the international law arguments.18 In addition, numerous law review
articles have addressed the validity of the U.S. juvenile death penalty,
and almost all of them have concluded that this practice violates in-
ternational law.19 This is also the position of a number of human rights
14. E.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1242–44 (10th Cir. 2002); Beazley v. Johnson, 242
F.3d 248, 263–68 (5th Cir. 2001); Ex parte Pressley, 770 So.2d 143, 147–49 (Ala. 2000); Ex parte
Burgess, 811 So.2d 617, 628–29 (Ala. 2000); Servin v. Nevada, 32 P.3d 1277, 1285–86 (Nev.
2001); Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998); see also Roach v. Aiken, 781 F.2d
379, 380–81 (4th Cir. 1986) (refusing to stay an execution pending a decision by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights concerning the legality of the juvenile death penalty).
15. E.g., Pressley, 770 So.2d at 150–51 (Houston, J., concurring); Burgess, 811 So.2d at 630–
32 (Houston, J., concurring); Servin, 32 P.3d at 1290–92 (Rose, J., concurring); Domingues, 961
P.2d at 1280–81 (Springer and Rose, JJ., dissenting). Justice Houston concurred rather than dis-
sented in the Alabama cases because, although he believed that the United States was bound by
treaty not to executive juvenile offenders, he also believed that the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari in Domingues indicated that the Court had a contrary view. Pressley, 770 So.2d at 151.
16. The Solicitor General argued that certiorari should be denied. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Domingues v. State of Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) (No. 98-8327)
[hereinafter Domingues Brief].
17. Raymond Bonner, Georgia Execution Is Stayed in Case of Youthful Offender, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at A12; Ed Timms, Beazley Stay May Not Be About Age, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 17, 2001, at 35A; Jim Yardley, Texas Execution Is Halted by State Court
of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at A10. The courts in these cases did not explain the ba-
sis for their stays, and it is not clear that the stays were in response to the international law ar-
guments. Before the Texas court issued its stay, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a stay by a vote
of 3-3, with the remaining three Justices recusing themselves because of connections they had to
the victim’s son (a federal judge). Beazley v. Johnson, 533 U.S. 969 (2001); Raymond Bonner,
Three Abstain as Supreme Court Declines to Halt Texas Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001,
at A1. The Texas court subsequently lifted its stay, the U.S. Supreme Court once again denied a
stay, Beazley v. Texas, 122 S. Ct. 2287 (2002), and the execution was carried out. Paul Duggan,
Killer of Judge’s Father Executed; Texas Injects Man Charged in Carjack Murder at Age 17,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2002, at A6.
18. See, e.g., Arianne Aryanpur, U.S. Is Urged to Quit Executing Youthful Offenders, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at 21; Editorial, End the Juvenile Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
2002, at A26; Editorial, The Disgrace of Juvenile Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at A34.
But see Jeff Jacoby, The Myth of Executing Children, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 2002, at E7 (sug-
gesting that critics of the juvenile death penalty are using the issue opportunistically as part of a
broader effort to end capital punishment).
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advocacy groups, including Amnesty International, the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group, and the Children’s Defense Fund.
And, in October 2002, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (a component of the Organization of American States based in
Washington, D.C.) issued a decision concluding that the execution of
juvenile offenders in the United States violates international law.20
Although important on its own terms, the juvenile death penalty
issue may also have broader implications for the relationship between
U.S. law and international human rights law. Litigants and scholars
have met with at least modest success in attempting to have interna-
tional human rights law incorporated into the U.S. legal system. This
success, however, has primarily come in the context of civil lawsuits
seeking damages for human rights abuses committed in foreign coun-
tries.21 Increasingly, litigants and scholars are seeking to build on this
success and persuade U.S. courts to apply international human rights
law internally as a basis for overriding domestic laws and practices.22
The juvenile death penalty has become a central focus of this effort,
and the way in which the international law challenges are resolved in
this context may have a significant impact on the viability of other at-
tempts to “domesticate” international human rights law.
19. E.g., Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Pro-
vide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 735 (1998); Joan F. Hartman,
“Unusual” Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application
of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983); Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reserva-
tion to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311 (1993); William A.
Schabas, Is the United States Death Penalty System Inconsistent with International Human Rights
Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2793 (1999); David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by
the United States Violates International Human Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 339
(1988). There are also numerous student notes and comments reaching the same conclusion.
E.g., Erica Templeton, Note, Killing Kids: The Impact of Domingues v. Nevada on the Juvenile
Death Penalty as a Violation of International Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1175 (2000). But see D. Kirk
Morgan II, Comment, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A New Chal-
lenge to the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States?, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 143
(2000) (arguing that the United States is not in violation of international law).
20. See infra note 254.
21. Beginning with the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), a number of courts have construed the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, as
authorizing federal court jurisdiction over international human rights law cases. See generally
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002) (discuss-
ing the history and current uses of the Alien Tort Statute).
22. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of
Action, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 421 (2000) (describing this phenomenon).
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This Article considers the international law arguments that have
been made against the juvenile death penalty, from the perspective of
both the international legal system and the U.S. legal system. Based
on a detailed examination of the United States’ interaction with
treaty regimes and international institutions since the late 1940s, the
Article concludes that the international law arguments have signifi-
cant weaknesses. As the Article documents, for a number of reasons,
the United States has consistently declined to consent to treaty provi-
sions restricting the juvenile death penalty, and it has consistently de-
clared the human rights treaties that contain such restrictions to be
non-self-executing. In addition, since at least the mid-1980s, the
United States has persistently objected to—and thereby legally opted
out of—any customary international law restriction on the juvenile
death penalty. Such a restriction could bind the United States, there-
fore, only if it developed before the mid-1980s, which is highly un-
likely.
The Article also argues that, even if the international law argu-
ments against the juvenile death penalty were more persuasive, they
would not provide a basis for relief in U.S. courts. For separation of
powers reasons, courts properly will decline to apply international law
to override the considered choices of the president and Senate in
their ratification of treaties. In addition, because of concerns relating
to both separation of powers and federalism, courts properly will de-
cline to apply customary international law to override state criminal
punishment, especially when (as is the case here) the political
branches have expressly declined to do so by treaty. This potential
gap between evolving international law norms and U.S. judicial en-
forcement is less disturbing than some commentators appear to as-
sume—it simply means that the juvenile death penalty issue, like
other difficult issues of social policy in the United States, must be re-
solved through U.S. democratic and constitutional processes.
I.  THE UNITED STATES AND THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
The juvenile death penalty has long been a feature of U.S. crimi-
nal punishment. Execution of juvenile offenders was permitted under
the English, and subsequently the American, common law.23 Children
23. See Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital
Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 614–16
(1983) (discussing the history of capital punishment for juveniles). For a discussion of the Eng-
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under the age of seven were conclusively presumed to have no crimi-
nal capacity.24 That presumption was rebuttable for children aged
seven to fourteen, and, if rebutted, the child could be convicted and
subjected to adult punishment, including execution.25 Individuals over
the age of fourteen were treated as adults for purposes of criminal
punishment.26 The first reported execution of a juvenile offender in
America was a 1642 execution in Plymouth Colony.27 By 1800, 7 juve-
nile offenders had been executed; by 1900, 95 had been executed.28
Execution of juvenile offenders continued even after the rise of
the juvenile justice system in the late 1800s and early 1900s.29 From
1900 to 1930, 77 persons were executed for crimes committed while
under the age of eighteen.30 Throughout American history, approxi-
mately 365 persons have been executed for crimes committed while
juveniles, which is slightly less than 2 percent of the total number of
executions.31 Most of these individuals were aged sixteen or over at
the time of their offense, but some were younger, especially in the
early years of the country’s history.32
No juvenile executions were carried out in this country between
1965 and 1984,33 in part because of the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision
in Furman v. Georgia34 (and the decisions that led up to it), which ef-
fectively stopped any use of the death penalty in the United States for
a number of years.35 Between 1976, the year the Supreme Court al-
lish common law concerning juvenile responsibility for crime, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *22–24.
24. Streib, supra note 23, at 614.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The case involved a sixteen-year-old named Thomas Graunger, who was convicted of
bestiality. ROBERT L. HALE, A REVIEW OF JUVENILE EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 27, 35–36
(1997); VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 73 (1987).
28. Streib, supra note 23, at 616.
29. Id. at 616–19; HALE, supra note 27, at 70–71; STREIB, supra note 27, at 56.
30. Streib, supra note 23, at 617, 630.
31. STREIB, supra note 10, at 4.
32. See Streib, supra note 23, at 619 (providing a table of juvenile executions by age).
33. See id. (noting that, in 1983 when the article was published, no juvenile executions had
been carried out since 1964); STREIB, supra note 10, at 4 (listing juvenile executions carried out
since 1985).
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
35. There were no legal executions of any kind in the United States between 1968 and
1976. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 13 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). For a discussion of
the declining use of the death penalty in the United States in the years leading up to this period,
see STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 208–230 (2002), and
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lowed reinstatement of the death penalty,36 and December 2002,
twenty-one juvenile offenders were executed, which is approximately
2.6 percent of the total number of executions in this period.37 One of
these individuals was sixteen at the time of his offense; the rest were
all seventeen.38 The age of the offenders at the time of their execution
ranged from twenty-three to thirty-eight.39
As noted, twenty-two of the thirty-eight states that have the
death penalty currently allow for the execution of juvenile offenders.40
As of December 2002, there were approximately eighty inmates, in
fifteen states, on death row under sentences received for crimes
committed while under the age of eighteen.41 This was approximately
2 percent of the total death row population of about 3,700.42 Four ju-
venile offenders were executed in the year 2000—two in Texas and
two in Virginia.43 Only one juvenile offender was executed in 2001, in
Texas.44 Three juvenile offenders were executed in 2002, all in Texas.45
In two decisions, the Supreme Court has considered whether the
imposition of capital punishment on juvenile offenders violates the
prohibition in the Eighth Amendment against “cruel and unusual
punishments” (as applied to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).46 In the first decision,
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 26–49 (1986).
36. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (holding that the death penalty
can be imposed if the jury’s discretion is properly channeled).
37. STREIB, supra note 10, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. For additional discussion of the statistics associated with the juvenile death penalty,
see LYNN COTHERN, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY, at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/coord
council (Nov. 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
40. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
41. STREIB, supra note 10, at 13; Death Penalty Information Center, Juveniles and the
Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvchar.html (last visited February 1, 2003)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
42. STREIB, supra note 10, at 13.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). The issue also was raised in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The Court did not reach the issue in that case, however, be-
cause it reversed the death sentence on other grounds. See id. at 113–17 (remanding for full con-
sideration of mitigating and aggravating factors). It did hold, however, that the sentencer may
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Thompson v. Oklahoma,47 a plurality of four Justices concluded that it
would violate the Eighth Amendment to execute an individual who
was only fifteen years of age at the time of his or her offense.48 These
Justices cited age requirements in a variety of state laws, as well as the
actions of prosecutors and juries, as supporting the conclusion that
“such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of cul-
pability that can justify the ultimate penalty.”49 This conclusion was
further supported, reasoned these Justices, by the views of organiza-
tions such as the American Bar Association and American Law Insti-
tute, and by the practices of other nations.50 In a footnote, these Jus-
tices noted that several treaties—the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights,
and the Fourth Geneva Convention—prohibit the execution of juve-
nile offenders.51
The fifth vote to vacate the death sentence in Thompson was
provided by Justice O’Connor. In her concurrence, she expressed the
view that “a national consensus forbidding the execution of any per-
son for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist,”
but she said that she was “reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a mat-
ter of constitutional law without better evidence than we now pos-
sess.”52 Instead, she concluded that the death sentence in the case
should be set aside because Oklahoma had not specified a minimum
age in its death penalty statute, but instead had simply stated in a dif-
ferent statute that fifteen-year-old murder defendants may be treated
as adults in some circumstances.53 This omission, reasoned Justice
O’Connor, meant that there was “considerable risk that the Okla-
not be precluded from considering “any relevant mitigating evidence,” including the youth of
the offender, in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 114.
47. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
48. Id. at 838.
49. Id. at 823.
50. See id. at 830–31 (noting the opposition of these organizations and nations to the juve-
nile death penalty). In his dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White, Justice Scalia argued that looking to the practice of other nations
is totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the fundamental beliefs of this Na-
tion. That 40% of our States do not rule out capital punishment for 15-year-old felons
is determinative of the question before us here, even if that position contradicts the
uniform view of the rest of the world. We must never forget that it is a Constitution
for the United States of America that we are expounding.
Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 831 n.34. I discuss these treaties in Part II.
52. Id. at 848–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 857–59.
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homa Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have the
effect of rendering fifteen-year-old defendants death eligible or did
not give the question the serious consideration that would have been
reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for the death
penalty.”54
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of the juvenile death
penalty the following Term in Stanford v. Kentucky.55 In that decision,
the Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of an individual
who committed his or her crime at the age of sixteen or seventeen.56
In the first footnote of the opinion, the Court stated that “it is Ameri-
can conceptions of decency that are dispositive,” and thereby rejected
the contention that the practices of other nations were relevant to its
analysis.57 The Court proceeded to review state and federal death
penalty laws and practice, and it concluded that no national consensus
could be found against the execution of juvenile offenders.58
These two decisions make clear that, under current doctrine,
there is no Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing indi-
viduals who are at least sixteen years of age at the time of their of-
fense. Given the lack of a majority opinion in Thompson, it is less
clear whether the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids execution
of individuals who commit their offense while under the age of six-
teen. In theory, this issue could be tested at some point, since a num-
ber of states still do not have statutory minimum age requirements for
the death penalty.59 In practice, however, this issue is unlikely to arise,
54. Id.
55. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
56. Id. at 380.
57. Id. at 369 n.1. The Court suggested that, if there were a widespread practice in the
United States against the execution of juvenile offenders, then the practice of other nations, es-
pecially other democracies, could be relevant in determining whether the U.S. practice was “not
merely a historical accident,” but, rather, “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id.
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice Brennan’s dissent, which was
joined by three other Justices, cited the laws and practices of other nations, as well as several
treaties that prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders. See id. at 389–90 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). His dissent also cited nonbinding United Nations resolutions on the subject. Id. at 390
n.10.
58. Id. at 370–73. Most of the opinion, including the language about looking only to Ameri-
can conceptions of decency, was written on behalf of a majority of the Court. A number of
commentators have nevertheless referred to the opinion as a “plurality,” or as simply reflecting
the views of Justice Scalia. E.g., de la Vega & Brown, supra note 19, at 737–39; Nanda, supra
note 19, at 1320, 1325–27, 1332.
59. STREIB, supra note 10, at 8.
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at least in the near future: none of the juvenile offenders executed
since 1976, and none of the juvenile offenders currently on death row,
was under sixteen years of age at the time of his offense.60 State
prosecutors appear to be treating Thompson as if it sets a minimum
age requirement of sixteen.
Although amicus curiae briefs were filed in Thompson and Stan-
ford raising international law arguments,61 none of the various opin-
ions in those cases discussed these arguments. The closest they came
was in their discussion of the relevance of international practice to the
Eighth Amendment analysis,62 a somewhat different issue. Thus, these
decisions do not themselves foreclose an international law challenge
to the juvenile death penalty, although they might provide some indi-
cation of the receptivity of particular Supreme Court Justices to such
a challenge. It is therefore not surprising, given the state of the case
law, that prisoners and human rights groups are increasingly relying
on international law, rather than U.S. constitutional law, to challenge
the juvenile death penalty.63
60. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
61. See generally Brief of the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative for the State
of Florida as Amicus Curiae at 18–20, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (No. 87-5765);
Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
62. See supra notes 50–51, 57, and accompanying text.
63. It is possible, of course, that the Supreme Court will reconsider its decision in Stanford
v. Kentucky. Recently, a majority of the Court concluded that the execution of the mentally re-
tarded violates the Eighth Amendment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002). In reaching
this conclusion, the Court briefly referred to international practice. Id. at 347 n.21. And, in a
recent dissent from the denial of certiorari in a death penalty case, four Supreme Court Justices
called for reconsideration of Stanford v. Kentucky in light of the Atkins decision. In re Stanford,
123 S. Ct. 472 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the reasons supporting the Atkins
decision “apply with equal or greater force to the execution of juvenile offenders”). On the
other hand, the majority in Atkins expressly distinguished the juvenile death penalty from the
execution of the mentally retarded, noting that there had been little reduction in state laws al-
lowing for the juvenile penalty since the Stanford decision. 536 U.S. at 347 n.18. As a result, the
Supreme Court may be unlikely to reconsider Stanford in the absence of a significant reduction
in the number of state laws allowing for the juvenile death penalty.
Notwithstanding Stanford, state constitutions and statutes can still be interpreted to pro-
hibit juvenile executions. See, e.g., Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1, 7–9 (Fla. 1999) (concluding
that a Florida statute allowing for the juvenile death penalty violated the Florida constitution);
State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102–03 (Wash. 1993) (construing the Washington state death
penalty statute as not applying to juveniles). In November 2002, voters in Florida approved a
state constitutional amendment that may have the effect of reinstating the juvenile death pen-
alty in that state. The amendment changes the state’s constitutional standard for “excessive
punishment” from “cruel or unusual” to “cruel and unusual,” thus mirroring the Eighth
Amendment standard in the federal Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; Florida Capital
News, Voters Approve Death Penalty Amendment (Nov. 6, 2002), at http://www.floridacapital
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The international law claims can be divided into two categories:
claims based on treaties, and claims based on customary international
law. I consider these claims in Parts II and III and conclude that they
are unpersuasive in light of well-settled international law require-
ments relating to state consent. As I explain, the record of U.S. inter-
actions with treaty regimes and international institutions since World
War II shows the United States has not consented, even implicitly, to
a ban on the juvenile death penalty. Furthermore, there is no basis
under international law for imposing such a ban on the United States
in the absence of its consent. In Part IV, I argue that, even if the in-
ternational law claims were valid under international standards, they
would not provide a right to relief in U.S. courts.
II.  TREATY CLAIMS
The international law challenge to the U.S. juvenile death pen-
alty encompasses a variety of arguments. As might be expected, the
challenge begins with a reference to U.S. treaty commitments. Al-
though there are a number of treaties that contain references to the
juvenile death penalty, the principal treaty relied upon by those who
challenge the U.S. practice is the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). This Part examines the arguments relating
to the ICCPR in detail, and then briefly considers other potential
treaty claims.
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR, which contains a wide-ranging list of individual
rights, is considered by many to be “the cornerstone of modern inter-
national human rights law.”64 The United States ratified the ICCPR in
1992, so there is little dispute that the treaty is binding on this coun-
try. Furthermore, the ICCPR contains a provision specifically pro-
hibiting the execution of juvenile offenders: Article 6 of the ICCPR,
which addresses the right to life and contains a partial exception to
that right for the death penalty, states in Subsection 5 that “[s]entence
of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
news.com/campaign/stories/110602amend1.htm> (last visited February 1, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
64. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 277 (1995).
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eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women.”65
Given this provision, as well as the U.S. Constitution’s inclusion
of treaties in its list of supreme federal law,66 the ICCPR argument
looks promising at first glance. It turns out, however, to have signifi-
cant difficulties. Most importantly, the U.S. ratification of the treaty
was subject to a series of “reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions,” or RUDs.67 These RUDs include the following provision spe-
cifically reserving the right to continue imposing the death penalty on
juvenile offenders:
[T]he United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than
a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws
permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age.68
These RUDs were proposed by the president, adopted by the Senate
as a condition of its advice and consent to the ICCPR, and included
with the U.S. instrument of ratification deposited with the United Na-
tions.69 Thus, despite its ratification of the ICCPR, the United States
has expressly declined to agree to the prohibition in the ICCPR on
juvenile executions. As a result, conventional international law analy-
sis would suggest that the United States’ use of the juvenile death
penalty does not violate the ICCPR. In the words of the International
Court of Justice, “[i]t is well established that in its treaty relations a
state cannot be bound without its consent.”70
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6, para. 5, S.
EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 25 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (ratified by the United States on June 8,
1992) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The drafters of the ICCPR rejected a proposal by the Soviet Union
to prohibit capital punishment. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 150–52 (2001).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
67. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter U.S.
RUDs].
68. Id.
69. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 404 (2000) (detailing the U.S. treatymaking process and the
role of proposed conditions in the ratification of treaties).
70. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
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B. Validity of the Juvenile Death Penalty Reservation
Unlike in some treaties, there is no provision in the ICCPR spe-
cifically prohibiting reservations.71 And, indeed, many nations at-
tached reservations to their ratification of the ICCPR. For example,
the United Kingdom broadly reserved the right to deviate from the
ICCPR in regulating its armed forces and in immigration matters;
Belgium reserved the right to engage in sex discrimination with re-
spect to the exercise of royal powers; and France refused to accept
Article 27 of the ICCPR, which prohibits denying ethnic, religious, or
linguistic minorities the right “to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”72
Commentators and litigants have argued, however, that the U.S.
reservation concerning the juvenile death penalty should be disre-
garded on the ground that it is contrary to the “object and purpose”
of the ICCPR.73 This argument is based on the Vienna Convention on
34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341 (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent.”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND
VALUES 28 (1995) (“For treaties, consent is essential. No treaty, old or new, whatever its char-
acter or subject, is binding on a state unless it has consented to it.”); William W. Bishop, Jr.,
Reservations to Treaties, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 245, 255 (1961) (“The fundamental basis re-
mains, that no state is bound in international law without its consent to the treaty. This is the
starting point for the law of treaties, and likewise for our international rules dealing with reser-
vations.”); cf. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (1927) (“International
law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States there-
fore emanate from their own free will . . . .”).
71. By contrast, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which calls for the abolition
of the death penalty, states that “[n]o reservation is admissible to the present Protocol, except
for a reservation made at the time of ratification or accession that provides for the application of
the death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military
nature committed during wartime.” Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, art. 2(1), G.A. Res.
44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/Res.44.128 (1989) (entered
into force July 11, 1991), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990). Only 46 nations have ratified this
Protocol, and the United States is not one of them. United Nations Treaty Collection, at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterIV/treaty17.asp (last
visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Another treaty disallowing reserva-
tions is the treaty establishing the permanent International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1988, art. 120, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 37 I.L.M.
999, 1066 (1998), corrected through July 1999 by U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/3 (“No reserva-
tions may be made to this Statute.”).
72. For these and other reservations to the ICCPR, see the United Nations Treaty Collec-
tion, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty6.asp
(last visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
73. A number of the points made in this Section concerning the juvenile death penalty are
drawn from the more general discussion of treaty reservations in Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 69.
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the Law of Treaties—a treaty that regulates the standards for treaty
ratification, interpretation, and termination.74 This Convention came
into force in 1980 and has now been ratified by ninety-four nations.75
Although the United States has not ratified the Convention, Execu-
tive Branch officials have stated that they accept at least much of the
Convention as reflecting binding customary international law,76 and
U.S. courts often have looked to the Convention for guidance on the
law of treaties.77 Article 19 of the Convention states that reservations
are not allowed, even if they are not expressly prohibited by a treaty,
if they are “incompatible with the object and purpose” of the treaty.78
The ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee—a monitoring body es-
tablished pursuant to the treaty79—has issued two comments that pro-
vide support for the object and purpose argument. In a comment on
U.S. human rights practices, issued in 1995, the Committee stated,
without explanation, that it believed that the U.S. reservation con-
cerning the juvenile death penalty was inconsistent with the object
74. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
336–37 (stating that a nation may formulate a reservation unless “the reservation is incompati-
ble with the object and purpose of the treaty”).
75. United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/english
internetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, at 145 & n.2; Maria Frankowska, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 298–99
(1988); see also Domingues Brief, supra note 16, at 8 n.3 (stating that the Vienna Convention “is
generally considered to be consistent with current treaty law and practice as recognized in the
United States”). In submitting the proposed Convention to the President, Secretary of State
William Rogers noted that the Convention “sets forth a generally agreed body of rules to gov-
ern all aspects of treaty making and treaty observance.” S. EXEC. DOC. L, 92-1, at 1 (1971)
(Message of the President of the United States transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties).
77. E.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000); Kreimer-
man v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714–15 (9th Cir. 1992). See generally Frankowska, supra note 76, at
307–80 (explaining that the Vienna Convention has been relied on or referred to by United
States courts rendering treaty decisions).
78. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
336–37. In submitting the proposed Convention to the President, the Secretary of State ob-
served that the object and purpose rule “is widely recognized in customary international law.” S.
EXEC. DOC. L, 92-1, supra note 76, at 2.
79. ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 28, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 31, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
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and purpose of the ICCPR.80 In a general comment issued a year ear-
lier, in 1994, the Committee had concluded that reservations that
violate the object and purpose of the ICCPR should generally be con-
sidered severable, “in the sense that the Covenant will be operative
for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.”81 The
Committee also expressed the view that “[i]t necessarily falls to the
Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compatible
with the object and purpose of the Covenant.”82 When combined,
these two comments suggest that the U.S. juvenile death penalty res-
ervation is invalid, and that the proper remedy for this invalidity is to
enforce the ICCPR against the United States as if it had never in-
cluded the reservation.
Both of these conclusions, it turns out, are highly questionable.
Before considering the merits of these conclusions, however, it is im-
portant to understand the Committee’s limited authority. The Com-
mittee is not a judicial body, and it has no official power to resolve
disputes or issue binding legal interpretations. It is instead charged
with receiving reports submitted by nations under the ICCPR’s self-
reporting provisions, and with issuing “such general comments as it
may consider appropriate.”83 The United States did state in a declara-
tion that it attached to its ratification of the ICCPR that it accepted
the competence of the Committee “to receive and consider communi-
80. Comments on United States of America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess.,
1413th mtg. ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995). The U.S. representative on the commit-
tee abstained from voting on this comment concerning his country, as is customary. The Com-
mittee also stated that the U.S. reservation to Article 7 of the ICCPR was incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty. Id. Article 7 provides in relevant part that “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” ICCPR, supra
note 65, art. 7, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. The U.S. reservation provided
that “the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment pro-
hibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.” U.S. RUDs, supra note 67, at 8070.
81. General Comment 24(52), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. ¶ 18,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). The United States did not have a representative on
the committee when this comment was issued.
82. Id.
83. ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 40(4), S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 34, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182.
The one hundred nations that have ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR have
agreed to have the Committee “receive and consider communications from individuals subject
to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights
set forth in the Covenant.” Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.1, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
The United States has not signed or ratified the First Optional Protocol.
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cations” under Article 41 of the ICCPR, which governs situations in
which one nation claims that another nation is not fulfilling its obliga-
tions under the ICCPR.84 But there is no suggestion in this declaration
that the United States was delegating any binding interpretive
authority to the Committee. And Article 41 itself states only that, if
the parties cannot work out the complaint, the Committee can issue a
“report” on the matter, which it will “communicate” to the parties.85
The Committee’s views, therefore, are not legally binding on the
United States as a matter of international law.86
1. Object and Purpose. To analyze the object and purpose ar-
gument, some background is necessary. Nations have made reserva-
tions to treaties since the end of the eighteenth century.87 Interna-
tional law traditionally imposed strict limitations on the ability of
nations to make a reservation and still become a party to a treaty. In a
bilateral treaty, a reservation was treated like a counteroffer under
domestic contract law; both parties to the treaty had to agree to every
reservation before the treaty became valid.88 For multilateral treaties,
the traditional rule was that a reserving state was not a party to a
treaty unless every other party to the treaty accepted the reserva-
tion.89
With the expansion of multilateral treatymaking after World
War II, there was concern that the unanimity rule was insufficiently
84. U.S. RUDs, supra note 67, at 8071; ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 41(1), S. EXEC. DOC. E,
95-2, at 34, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182.
85. ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 41(1)(h)(ii), S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 35, 999 U.N.T.S. at
183.
86. See Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to
Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 277, 299 (1999) (“In order for the Committee
to have legal authority over the reservations submitted by states parties, the express consent of
the states parties would be required through ratification of an amendment to the Covenant or
some similar means.”). A chairperson of the Committee has stated that, “[w]hile the general
comment did not suggest that the Committee’s interpretations were binding, the Committee
hoped they would be given careful consideration by State parties.” Summary Record, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1406th mtg. ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1406 (1995). Al-
though U.S. courts have sometimes looked to the Committee’s views when interpreting the
ICCPR, they have done so “only for guidance, not to void an action by the Senate.” Beazley v.
Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001).
87. In the United States, the first reservation to a bilateral treaty was the U.S. Senate’s res-
ervation to the Jay Treaty in 1794. An early example of a reservation to a multilateral treaty was
Sweden-Norway’s reservation to certain parts of the Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Bishop, supra note 70, at 260–62.
88. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 54 (1973).
89. Id. at 54–56.
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flexible and that it thwarted maximum participation in multilateral
treaties.90 Such flexibility was thought to be essential for the making
of treaties, especially human rights treaties, among an increasingly
large number of countries that were politically and culturally di-
verse.91 In 1951, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) embraced a
more flexible approach to reservations in its advisory opinion in Res-
ervations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.92 The ICJ reasoned that the aim of securing wide-
spread ratification of the Genocide Convention necessitated a more
relaxed approach to reservations. It explained that, with respect to
such a treaty, “one cannot speak of individual advantages or disad-
vantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual bal-
ance between rights and duties.”93 The ICJ therefore held that a re-
serving state could be a party to the Genocide Convention even if
some parties to the Convention objected to the reservation. The ICJ
stated, however, that if a state makes a reservation incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, the state “can-
not be regarded as being a party to the Convention.”94
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was
opened for signature in 1969 and entered into force in 1980, codified a
flexible approach to reservations similar to the one outlined in the
Genocide Convention decision. As noted, Article 19 of the Vienna
Convention allows a party to formulate a reservation to a treaty un-
less the treaty prohibits reservations or “the reservation is incompati-
ble with the object and purpose of the treaty.”95 Articles 20 and 21
then establish rules for acceptance or rejection of reservations, and
the consequences that follow from acceptance or rejection. When a
treaty party accepts another nation’s reservation, the reserving nation
becomes a party to the treaty in relation to the accepting nation.96 A
reservation is deemed accepted by any nation that does not raise an
objection to the reservation within twelve months of notification of
the reservation, or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be
90. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 69, at 431.
91. Id.
92. 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 29.
95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
96. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 20(4)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 337.
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bound by the treaty, whichever is later.97 An objection to a reserva-
tion does not preclude entry into force of the treaty between the re-
serving and the objecting nation unless the objecting nation says so
definitively; rather, the provision to which the reservation relates is
simply inapplicable between the two nations to the extent of the res-
ervation.98 This flexible approach, as the United Nations’ Interna-
tional Law Commission has explained, is designed to encourage wide-
spread participation in treaty regimes.99
Arguably, the Vienna Convention leaves the determination of
whether a reservation violates the object and purpose of a treaty to
the treaty parties.100 Under this approach, the U.S. reservation is al-
most certainly valid. Only 11 of the 147 nations that are parties to the
ICCPR formally objected to the United States’ juvenile death penalty
97. Id. art. 20(5).
98. Id. art. 21(3).
99. The International Law Commission, in its comments on the draft terms of the Vienna
Convention, explained that “a power to formulate reservations must in the nature of things tend
to make it easier for some States to execute the act necessary to bind themselves finally to par-
ticipating in the treaty and therefore tend to promote a greater measure of universality in the
application of the treaty.” Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 169, 205, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. See generally Richard D. Kearney
& Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 508–14 (1970) (discussing
the history of the provisions in the Vienna Convention relating to reservations).
100. In its commentary on the draft provision of the Vienna Convention containing the ob-
ject and purpose limitation, the International Law Commission explained that the admissibility
of a reservation “is in every case very much a matter of the appreciation of the acceptability of
the reservation by the other contracting States.” Report of the Commission to the General As-
sembly, supra note 99, at 207. Moreover, in the debates over the reservations provisions of the
Vienna Convention, the delegates, like the International Law Commission, rejected a “colle-
giate” approach, pursuant to which a certain proportion of the parties to the treaty would have
to approve a reservation, in favor of a “flexible” approach, pursuant to which each party would
decide for itself whether to approve the reservation. See United Nations Conference on the Law
of Treaties, Official Records, 1st Sess., 24th mtg. at 125–36, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 (1969);
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, 2nd Sess., 10th Mtg. at 29–
30, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11/Add.1, at 29–30 (1970). Under the flexible approach, it is “for each
state individually to decide whether to accept a reservation and to regard the reserving State as
a party to the treaty.” SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 61. Some international law commentators
have argued, however, that a reservation that violates the object and purpose of a treaty does
not become valid merely because the other parties to the treaty accept it. See Catherine Redg-
well, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties,
64 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 245, 263–69 (1993) (summarizing the debate over this issue). Even if one
accepts this argument, it still might make sense to consider the responses of the treaty parties in
evaluating whether a reservation is in fact incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty.
In any event, as a practical matter, in the absence of an authoritative independent adjudication,
“it is up to the individual appreciation of States whether a reservation is compatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.” Id. at 264.
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reservation.101 These numbers stand in sharp contrast, for example, to
the standard specified in the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, pursuant to which a
reservation is considered incompatible with the object and purpose of
that treaty if two-thirds of the parties to the treaty object to it.102
Moreover, none of the objections to the U.S. reservation was made
within the twelve-month period for objections specified in the Vienna
Convention.103 Under the terms of the Vienna Convention, therefore,
the U.S. reservations are deemed accepted. In addition, none of the
nations that objected to the reservation refused to be a party to the
treaty with the United States as a result of the reservation. The Vi-
enna Convention therefore suggests that, at worst, the United States
is a party to the treaty and the juvenile death penalty provision simply
does not apply between the United States and the objecting nations.
Even if a more objective test should be imposed, independent of
the reactions of the treaty parties, the U.S. reservation would proba-
bly satisfy such a test. The ICCPR contains a long list of civil and po-
litical rights relating to a wide range of issues, including self-
determination, criminal procedure, equal treatment, privacy, and re-
ligious freedom. Only one subpart of one article in the treaty ad-
dresses the juvenile death penalty. This structure suggests that it was
not a central purpose of the ICCPR to prohibit the execution of juve-
nile offenders. By contrast, the Genocide and Torture Conventions,
for example, are both designed to protect a single, overwhelmingly
important right.104 If the United States had ratified those treaties while
101. For documentation of this point, see the United Nations Treaty Collection, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty6.asp (last
visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
102. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, art. 20(2), S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2, at 10–11 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 236 (entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969). There are currently 159 parties to this Convention; thus, more than 100
nations would have to object to a reservation for it to be deemed to violate the Convention’s
object and purpose under this two-thirds test. United Nations Treaty Collection, at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterIV/treaty2.asp (last
visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
103. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 20(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at
337; United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/sample/EnglishInternet
Bible/partI/chapterIV/treaty2.asp (last visited Jan 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
104. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
June 26, 1987); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
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reserving the right to commit genocide or torture, the reservations
presumably would have violated the treaties’ object and purpose, for
little would remain of the obligations under the treaty. But much re-
mains of the United States’ obligations under the ICCPR even if the
United States is not bound by the juvenile death penalty provision.
2. Other Challenges. Another argument that is sometimes made
in this context is that the U.S. reservation is invalid because the juve-
nile death penalty provision is one of a number of treaty provisions
declared by the ICCPR to be “nonderogable.”105 As the ICCPR
makes clear, however, “derogability” concerns the ability of nations
to deviate, in time of emergency, from treaty obligations that they
have already adopted; it does not concern the ability of nations to re-
serve out of treaty provisions in the first instance.106 Moreover, some
provisions are deemed nonderogable “merely because their suspen-
sion is irrelevant to the legitimate control of national emergency by
the state” or because such suspension “is impossible to control.”107 A
reservation to a nonderogable treaty provision, therefore, does not
necessarily violate the object and purpose of the treaty. Even the
ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee has agreed with this point.108 In
addition, although the United States was the only nation that adopted
a reservation with respect to the juvenile death penalty, a number of
105. See ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 4(2), S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174
(stating that no derogation is allowed “from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and
18”).
106. Id. art. 4(1) (allowing nations to derogate “from their obligations under the present
Covenant”).
107. Schabas, supra note 64, at 294.
108. See General Comment 24(52), supra note 81, ¶ 10 (noting that “there is no automatic
correlation between reservations to non-derogable provisions, and reservations which offend
against the object and purpose of the Covenant”). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
based in Costa Rica, has issued an advisory opinion stating that reservations to the “non-
derogable fundamental rights” of the American Convention on Human Rights are inconsistent
with the object and purpose of that treaty. Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Articles 4(2) and
4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 320,
341 (1984). The Court appears to have had in mind a class of rights narrower than all of the
nonderogable rights. Moreover, the Court distinguished between reservations that allow for a
total deprivation of a fundamental right, and reservations that are designed “merely to restrict
certain aspects of a non-derogable right without depriving the right as a whole of its basic pur-
pose.” Id. Under this analysis, it can be argued that the U.S. reservation to the juvenile death
penalty provision—one subpart of the right to life provisions of Article 6 of the ICCPR—merely
restricts certain aspects of the fundamental right to life, and does not deprive the right of its ba-
sic purpose. In any event, the United States is not a party to the Inter-American Court or the
American Convention.
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other nations adopted reservations with respect to other nonderoga-
ble treaty provisions, further suggesting that there is no inherent con-
flict between reservations and nonderogability.109
It is also sometimes argued that the U.S. reservation is invalid
because the prohibition on executing juvenile offenders is not only a
treaty norm, but is also a matter of customary international law. As I
discuss in Part III, the United States is probably not bound by any
customary international law prohibition on the juvenile death pen-
alty. But even if it is, this argument incorrectly assumes that nations
are obligated, when they ratify a treaty, to accept all terms in the
treaty that reflect customary international law. Although the
ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee has endorsed that assumption in
passing,110 there does not appear to be any basis for it in international
law. A nation’s attachment of a reservation to a treaty provision is not
itself a violation of the provision. It is simply a decision by the nation
making the reservation not to bind itself to the treaty regime, and its
associated enforcement procedures, with respect to the provision in
question.111 No one claims that nations have an international law obli-
gation to bind themselves to such treaty regimes and procedures in
the first instance. It is not argued, for example, that the United States
would have violated customary international law if it had declined to
ratify the ICCPR altogether. Nor is it argued that the United States is
in violation of international law for having declined to ratify the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, even though there is wide-
spread agreement that at least some of its terms reflect customary in-
ternational law. Because it is clear that nations can refuse to ratify a
treaty with terms that are reflective of customary international law, it
is difficult to understand how or why international law would obligate
them, when they do ratify the treaty, to accept the treaty in its en-
tirety. Moreover, such a requirement would have undesirable conse-
quences for treatymaking. Given the amorphous nature of customary
109. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 111 (2000). For example,
there were reservations to the prohibition in Article 11 on imprisonment for contractual obliga-
tions and to the criminal retroactivity provisions of Article 15. Schabas, supra note 64, at 293–94.
110. See General Comment 24(52), supra note 81, ¶ 8 (“Accordingly, provisions in the
Covenant that represent customary international law (and a fortiori when they have the charac-
ter of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations.”). The Committee has given
effect to reservations, however, that relate to provisions in the ICCPR that arguably reflect cus-
tomary international law. Schabas, supra note 64, at 295 n.95.
111. See Observations by the United States on General Comment 24, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP.
265, 265–69 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. Response] (“A State which expressly withholds its consent
from a provision cannot be presumed, on the basis of some legal fiction, to be bound by it.”).
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international law—a point I discuss in Part III—it will often be diffi-
cult for nations to know, when they ratify a treaty, whether a particu-
lar provision is reflective of customary international law. A rule that
outlawed reservations to all treaty terms reflective of customary in-
ternational law would thus create substantial uncertainty about the
validity of treaty reservations and, more broadly, about the status of
treaty relationships.
3. Severability. The severability analysis of the ICCPR’s Human
Rights Committee is also flawed. Even if the U.S. reservation were
invalid, it would not be proper under international law simply to dis-
regard the reservation and bind the United States to the prohibition
on executing juvenile offenders. Consider first the situation of a bilat-
eral treaty. It is well settled that, if a nation attaches a condition to its
ratification of a bilateral treaty, the condition operates as a counterof-
fer, such that there is no binding treaty unless the other party accepts
the condition. Multilateral treaties work somewhat differently, in part
because of the impracticality of separate negotiations between all the
possible pairings of parties. The different rule for multilateral treaties,
as set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is that a
nation can be a party to the treaty even if all the other parties do not
accept its conditions. In this situation, the nation that attaches the
condition may have a limited treaty relationship, or even no treaty
relationship, with the objecting nations, while having a full treaty rela-
tionship with the other parties. But this Vienna Convention regime
still recognizes the contractual nature of these relationships, such that
nations are bound only by the treaty commitments they actually
make. As one commentator notes, “[i]t was never the intention of the
[International Court of Justice], the [International Law Commission],
or the [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] that a State
should be bound by a provision to which it had not indicated its con-
sent.”112
The severability analysis of the Human Rights Committee is in-
consistent with this regime. If the U.S. reservation on the juvenile
death penalty were severed in the way suggested by the Committee,
112. Redgwell, supra note 100, at 267. The Committee’s severability analysis is rendered
even more problematic by the Committee’s conclusion in another general comment that nations
may not withdraw from the ICCPR. General Comment 26(61), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
53rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998). When combined, the Committee’s
comments suggest that the United States (or another country) could find itself in a treaty regime
to which it had never consented, and it would have no legal right to exit from that regime.
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the United States would be bound by a treaty provision that it ex-
pressly declined to ratify, in conflict with the well-settled rule that
treaties bind only nations that consent to them.113 The United Nations’
International Law Commission has expressed support for this conclu-
sion and, along with several individual nations, has criticized the con-
trary views of the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee.114 This conclu-
sion seems especially clear where, as here, the United States has
stated that its reservations to the ICCPR are “integral parts of its con-
sent to be bound by the Covenant and are not severable.”115 The long
and difficult history of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties—
whereby the United States refused to ratify any of the major human
rights treaties for many years, and then began to ratify the treaties
only after the president and Senate agreed upon a carefully
formulated package of reservations—further demonstrates the
importance of such reservations to the United States’ consent.116
At first glance, it might appear that two decisions from the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights provide support for the Committee’s
views. In these decisions, the European Court held that reservations
to the European Convention on Human Rights were invalid, and it
113. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
114. The United States, Great Britain, and France objected to the views of the ICCPR’s
Human Rights Committee expressed in General Comment 24(52), including its views concern-
ing the proper remedy for invalid reservations. See Observations by France on General Com-
ment 24 on Reservations to the ICCPR, 4 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 6, 6–8 (1997); Observations by
the United Kingdom on General Comment 24, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 261, 261–69 (1996); U.S.
Response, supra note 111, at 265–69. In a 1997 preliminary report, the United Nations’ Interna-
tional Law Commission similarly rejected a number of the conclusions in General Comment
24(52). Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Ninth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997).
115. U.S. Response, supra note 111, at 269.
116. For a discussion of this history, see NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 69, at 410–16. In an important recent article, Professor Ryan Goodman argues that interna-
tional law should allow for the severability of invalid reservations that are not integral to a
state’s consent to be bound by a treaty. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reser-
vations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 532 (2002). It is not clear how Professor
Goodman’s proposed approach would work in practice, since he does not specify who should
decide the severability question or what evidence should be considered in resolving this ques-
tion (although he apparently would place the burden of proof on the party seeking to avoid sev-
erance). Id. at 555–59. In any event, as noted, the United States has made clear that its juvenile
death penalty reservation is integral to its consent to be bound, and its contention is supported
by the history of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties, so presumably this reservation would
not be severed under Professor Goodman’s approach. See supra notes 67–70, 115, and accom-
panying text.
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enforced the treaty as if the reservations had not been taken.117 These
decisions, however, have little relevance to the U.S. reservations to
the ICCPR and other global human rights treaties. In part, this is be-
cause the decisions were premised on a finding that the countries in-
tended to be bound by the European Convention regardless of the
fate of their reservations.118 By contrast, the U.S. reservations were
clearly a condition of U.S. ratification of the ICCPR. More signifi-
cantly, the European Court was “not simply applying general princi-
ples of treaty law.”119 Instead, it was interpreting the particular provi-
sions of the European Convention in light of the Convention’s role as
an “instrument of European public order (ordre public).”120 These
principles do not apply beyond Europe and thus cannot supersede the
controlling principles of the Vienna Convention and related custom-
ary international law.
C. Other Treaties
There does not appear to be any other plausible treaty claim.
The only other treaty that the United States has ratified that prohibits
the execution of juvenile offenders is the Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (referred to
117. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
118. In the Belilos case, Switzerland explicitly conceded this point. See Goodman, supra
note 116, at 550 (quoting a statement made during oral argument by the Swiss representative);
see also Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilateral
Treaties, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 347, 382 (1989) (“The Court of Human Rights correctly found that
the declaration was severable from the Swiss acceptance of the Convention; that Switzerland’s
overriding intention was to accept the obligations of the European Convention.”); Schabas, su-
pra note 64, at 319 (stating that Switzerland admitted its desire to be bound by the European
Convention). In the Loizidou case, by contrast, the court inferred this intent. 310 Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 28; Schabas, supra note 64, at 321–22; see also Baylis, supra note 86, at 302–06 (discussing the
Belilos and Loizidou decisions, and concluding that they do not provide substantial support for
the Committee’s severability analysis); Morgan, supra note 19, at 171 (“Unlike the facts in Lo-
izidou, there is no indication that the United States foresaw any treaty body ruling on whether
its reservations to the ICCPR were severable or non-severable.”).
119. Redgwell, supra note 100, at 266; see also Susan Marks, Reservations Unhinged: The
Belilos Case Before the European Court of Human Rights, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 300, 327
(1990) (analyzing the Belilos decision and tying it to “structural features of the [European] Con-
vention”).
120. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27.
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as the “Fourth Geneva Convention”),121 a treaty that has now been
ratified by approximately 180 nations.122 The last clause of Article 68
of this treaty prohibits imposition of the death penalty on “protected
person[s]” (civilians and other noncombatants) who are under eight-
een years of age at the time of the offense.123 The relevant provisions
of this treaty, however, apply only in situations involving an armed
conflict or military occupation, and Article 68 applies only to indi-
viduals who are not nationals of the occupying power.124 As a result, it
has no bearing on the use of the death penalty in domestic criminal
cases.125
The United States has signed, but has not ratified, the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child and the American Convention on
Human Rights, both of which contain provisions prohibiting the exe-
cution of juvenile offenders.126 A treaty binds only those nations that
have “establishe[d] on the international plane [their] consent to be
bound” by the treaty.127 Although this consent can take a variety of
121. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. This
treaty also requires, as a condition of imposing the death penalty, that the offense be subject to
capital punishment under the preexisting laws of the occupied territory. Id. art. 68, cl. 2, 6 U.S.T.
at 3560, 75 U.N.T.S. at 330. The United States (like a number of other countries) attached a res-
ervation to its ratification of the treaty declining to agree to this restriction. Id. 6 U.S.T. at 3660,
75 U.N.T.S. at 432. It did not, however, attach a reservation concerning the juvenile death pen-
alty.
122. International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions, and Successions, at http://www.
icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/77EA1BDEE20B4CCDC1256B6600595596 (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
123. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 121, art. 68, cl. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3560, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 330.
124. Id. arts. 2, 4, 68, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 3560, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288, 290, 330.
125. I discuss the Fourth Geneva Convention in greater detail in Part III, in connection with
claims being made under customary international law. See infra notes 179–81. Two protocols to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions also prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders. Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 77(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 (en-
tered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
II), June 8, 1977, art. 6(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). These pro-
tocols, like the Fourth Geneva Convention, do not apply to domestic criminal cases. In any
event, the United States has not ratified the protocols.
126. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37(a), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 55
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art.
4(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
127. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 2(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at
333.
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forms, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the American
Convention on Human Rights, like other multilateral human rights
treaties, require the deposit of an instrument of ratification or acces-
sion as the manifestation of consent.128 Because the United States has
not deposited such an instrument, it is not bound by these treaties.129
A signatory to a treaty, according to Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, does have an obligation not to do
anything that “would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty
“until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to
the treaty.”130 Like the ICCPR, however, the Child Convention and
the American Convention contain a long list of rights on a variety of
subjects and mention the juvenile death penalty as only one subpart
of a single article.131 As a result, they do not appear to have as their
object and purpose the abolition of the juvenile death penalty. In ad-
dition, the United States has indicated that, if and when it does ratify
these treaties, it will attach a reservation declining to agree to the ban
on juvenile executions.132 The U.S. signature of these treaties, there-
fore, does not show any acceptance of the juvenile death penalty pro-
visions.
III.  CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Because of the difficulties with the treaty arguments, interna-
tional law challenges to the juvenile death penalty are increasingly fo-
cused on customary law rather than treaties. As noted, customary in-
ternational law is commonly defined as the law of the international
community that “results from a general and consistent practice of
128. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 126, arts. 47–48, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 60;
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 126, art. 74, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 161.
129. See AUST, supra note 109, at 75–92 (explaining the difference between signature and
ratification).
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336.
131. The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains a variety of provisions relating to,
among other things, discrimination, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, privacy, adop-
tion, health care, and standard of living. Its prohibition on the juvenile death penalty is set forth
in a subpart of Article 37. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 126, art. 37(a),
1577 U.N.T.S. at 55. The American Convention on Human Rights contains a variety of provi-
sions relating to, among other things, criminal procedure, privacy, freedom of religion, and par-
ticipation in government. Its prohibition on the juvenile death penalty is set forth in a subpart of
Article 4. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 126, art. 4(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. at
146.
132. See infra notes 184–85, 225, and accompanying text.
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states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”133 If cus-
tomary international law now prohibits the execution of juvenile of-
fenders, it might impose a legal obligation on the United States to
eliminate this practice even if the United States is not obligated to do
so by treaty.
A. Attractions of the Customary International Law Argument
There are a number of reasons why this customary international
law argument might seem more promising than the treaty arguments.
Most notably, the “practice of states” component of this argument
looks compelling, as almost all nations have now abolished the juve-
nile death penalty. Indeed, only seven nations (including the United
States) are reported to have executed juvenile offenders since 1990,
and, as noted, the other six are not necessarily good human rights
company.134 Furthermore, even those nations have now ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits juvenile exe-
cutions.135
To be sure, these numbers are not by themselves dispositive. At
least according to most international law theorists, customary interna-
tional law requires not only widespread state practice, but also that
the nations in question are acting out of a sense of legal obligation. It
is unclear, however, whether the nations that have abolished the ju-
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 102(2). The basic elements of this definition
are widely accepted, both inside and outside the United States. The governing statute for the
International Court of Justice lists “international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law” as one of the types of law that the Court is to apply. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. The Court has stated that, for a
rule of customary international law to arise, “[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of
a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
134. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
135. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 126, art. 37(a), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 55.
All but two nations in the world—the United States and Somalia—have ratified the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/Eng-
lish/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterIV/treaty15.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). This state practice point assumes that it is proper to count only
the practice of nation-states, which is the traditional rule. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL)
INTERNATIONAL LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW § 8 (2000). As customary international law
comes to regulate matters traditionally regulated at the local level, it is arguable that the prac-
tice of individual states in federal nations should also be counted. If so, one would need to take
account of the practices of the U.S. states that still retain the juvenile death penalty.
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venile death penalty have done so out of a sense of legal obligation,
or at least a sense of legal obligation that is separate from their vari-
ous treaty commitments.136 It is possible that they have done so pri-
marily for moral or policy reasons, not because they believe that in-
ternational law (apart from particular treaties) prohibits the
execution of juvenile offenders.137
Nevertheless, a plausible case can be made that the widespread
international abolition of the juvenile death penalty, the numerous
treaties that disapprove of the practice, and various statements by na-
tions and international organizations show the requisite “sense of le-
gal obligation.” This is especially so given the uncertain and open-
ended nature of modern customary international law formation.138
Perhaps for these reasons, the Solicitor General’s amicus curiae brief
in the Domingues case139 could be read as suggesting that the custom-
ary international law argument should be taken more seriously than
the treaty arguments. In that brief, the Solicitor General disputed es-
sentially all aspects of the treaty argument on the merits, maintaining
that the petitioner’s contentions were “incorrect” and “fall wide of
the mark.”140 On the customary international law argument, however,
the Solicitor General noted that the claim “raises numerous issues of
considerable difficulty and complexity, with potentially far-reaching
significance.”141 Although the Solicitor General did contest one aspect
of the customary international law claim, his principal argument was
that the claim had not been adequately raised and developed below,
such that the case was not an “appropriate vehicle” for Supreme
Court review.142
136. For a discussion of the uncertain relationship between treaties and customary interna-
tional law, see generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of
Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988).
137. Cf. Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 373 (6th Cir. 2001) (“There is no indication that the
countries that have abolished the death penalty have done so out of a sense of legal obligation,
rather than for moral, political, or other reasons.”).
138. For discussion of the many uncertainties surrounding the formation of modern custom-
ary international law, see generally David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Cus-
tom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 198
(1996); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 449 (2000).
139. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
140. Domingues Brief, supra note 16, at 5, 9.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id.
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In the next two Sections, I explore the one substantive objection
to the customary international law argument that the Solicitor Gen-
eral did raise: that even if customary international law now prohibits
the execution of juvenile offenders, the United States has effectively
opted out of such a prohibition. As I show, there is substantial evi-
dence that the United States has in fact opted out.
B. Persistent Objector Rule
It is widely accepted that nations that persistently object to a cus-
tomary international norm while it is being developed are not bound
by the norm. The “persistent objector” rule stems from the proposi-
tion that, in a world of diverse sovereign nations lacking a central de-
cisionmaker, customary international law draws its legitimacy from
national consent. If a nation has persistently objected to a norm prior
to its formation, the reasoning goes, the nation has not given even
tacit consent to the norm.143 The persistent objector rule also facili-
tates the development of new norms of customary international law
by preventing them from being blocked, either by a lack of unanimity,
or, if unanimity is not required, a lack of agreement on how to count
votes.144
While not without its challengers,145 the persistent objector rule is
as close to a settled proposition as one can find in international law. It
has been endorsed by the International Court of Justice,146 the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights,147 most of the major trea-
tises on international law,148 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law.149 It also was endorsed recently in a comprehensive re-
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 102 reporters’ note 2; KAROL WOLFKE,
CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (2d rev. ed. 1993); David A. Colson, How Per-
sistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 957, 957 (1986); Ted L. Stein, The
Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 459 (1985); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in Inter-
national Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 434 (1983).
144. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1,
26 (1974–75).
145. E.g., ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 70
(1971); Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1985); Kelly, supra note 138, at 508.
146. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277–78 (Nov. 20); Fisheries Case (U.K.
v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18).
147. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
148. E.g., 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (5th ed. 1998).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 102 cmt. d & reporters’ note 2.
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port by the customary international law committee of the Interna-
tional Law Association.150 The committee explained that “[a]lthough
some authors question the existence of this rule, most accept it as part
of current international law.”151 The committee also cited national
practice in support of this rule, including national practice of the
United States.152
Although nations have not historically invoked the persistent
objector rule with much frequency, the rule has become more signifi-
cant in recent years as a result of changes in the process of customary
international law formation.153 If nonbinding materials such as unrati-
fied treaties and United Nations resolutions can lead to the creation
of binding customary international law (as modern customary inter-
national law theory contends), then it becomes especially important
to allow nations a means of opting out of these emerging rules. Oth-
erwise, the consensual nature of treaty regimes will be undermined,
and international organizations will assume legislative power never
delegated to them. Perhaps more importantly, powerful nations like
the United States are unlikely to accept this new form of customary
international law without the ability to opt out. This is particularly
true of customary international law rules that purport to govern mat-
ters formerly of only domestic concern, such as human rights stan-
dards governing the relationship between governments and their citi-
zens.
Most commentators critical of the U.S. juvenile death penalty
purport to accept the persistent objector rule in theory. They never-
theless argue that the United States is unable to rely on this rule for
two reasons. First, they contend that the United States has not suffi-
ciently registered its objection to a customary international law pro-
hibition on juvenile executions. Instead of persistently objecting, they
say, the United States has essentially remained silent during the de-
velopment of the prohibition, thereby “acquiescing” in it. Professor
Joan Fitzpatrick (formerly Joan Hartman), for example, has de-
scribed the U.S. position on the juvenile death penalty as a “[m]ere
failure to conform to the norm.”154 Similarly, Professor David Weiss-
150. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 135, § 15.
151. Id. cmt. c.
152. Id.
153. Stein, supra note 143, at 457; J. Brock McClane, How Late in the Emergence of a Norm
of Customary International Law May a Persistent Objector Object?, 13 ILSA J. INT’L L. 1, 6
(1989).
154. Hartman, supra note 19, at 686.
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brodt describes it as a “single, internal protest.”155 Second, and more
dramatically, some commentators argue that the international law
ban on the juvenile death penalty now qualifies as a jus cogens, or
“peremptory,” norm, for which there is no right to opt out.156
With respect to the first argument, these commentators typically
do not go through the history of U.S. interactions with treaty regimes
and international institutions in any detail. As I show, this history
demonstrates that the United States has a long record of dissenting
from any evolving norm against the juvenile death penalty.
1. Timing Question. The persistent objector rule does not allow
nations to opt out of a customary international law norm after the
norm has “crystallized,” i.e., after there is widespread national prac-
tice in support of the norm, followed by these nations out of a sense
of legal obligation.157 Thus, as an initial matter, one must have some
sense of when the alleged norm of customary international law devel-
oped. The critics of the juvenile death penalty do not usually specify a
particular date, or even a particular time period.
A strong argument can be made that the proper time period is
somewhere between 1990 and 2000, and, in any event, no earlier than
the mid-1980s. Most of the customary international law arguments
against the juvenile death penalty revolve around two treaties—the
ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Both of these
treaties contain prohibitions on juvenile executions, and it is argued
that the widespread ratification of these treaties has led to the crea-
tion of a customary international law rule binding on nations that
have not ratified the treaties.158 In terms of the number of ratifying na-
tions, the Child Convention looks more compelling, since all but two
nations (the United States and Somalia) are now parties to that
155. Weissbrodt, supra note 19, at 369. See also Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and
Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 147, 171 (1996) (“[T]he objection has been inconsistent, mostly taking the form of silence
and acquiescence as the norm developed on the international scene.”); Dinah Shelton, Note, 8
HUM. RTS. L.J. 355, 359 (1987) (“United States practice has been neither persistent nor une-
quivocal.”).
156. E.g., de la Vega & Brown, supra note 19, at 759–62; Kha Q. Nguyen, Note, In Defense
of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the Capital Punishment of Juveniles in the United States,
28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 401, 402 (1995).
157. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 102 cmt. d (stating that dissent must
be made “while the law is still in the process of development”).
158. For examples of such arguments, see de la Vega & Brown, supra note 19, at 756–59;
Nanda, supra note 19, at 1328–34.
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treaty.159 But that treaty did not become effective until 1990, after it
had been ratified by 20 nations, and it obtained widespread ratifica-
tion only by the mid to late 1990s.160 The ICCPR took effect much
earlier—in 1976, after it had been ratified by 35 nations—but its
numbers are less impressive: even today, only 147 of the approxi-
mately 193 nations in the world have ratified it.161 Moreover, almost
one-half of these ratifications came in the 1990s.162
Additional support for this time period comes from the fact that,
for the most part, academic commentators, U.S. litigants, and interna-
tional bodies did not begin asserting that customary international law
prohibited the juvenile death penalty until the 1990s. The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1987, sets forth a list
of national actions prohibited by customary international human
rights law. While the Restatement (Third) is generally progressive in
its approach to international human rights law, neither the death pen-
alty in general nor the juvenile death penalty is on its list.163 A survey
of U.S. law reviews shows that almost all academic claims that cus-
tomary international law prohibits the juvenile death penalty have
been made after 1990.164 In U.S. courts, although the juvenile death
penalty has been challenged since the early 1980s on Eighth Amend-
ment grounds, it was not directly challenged on international law
grounds until the 1990s (although amicus curiae briefs were filed as-
serting international law arguments in the late 1980s). Finally, as I
document in subsection 3, while United Nations organizations began
criticizing the juvenile death penalty in the early 1980s, they did not
begin asserting that it was barred by international law until the 1990s.
159. See supra note 135.
160. United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/english
internetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty15.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
161. United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/
part_boo/iv_boo/iv_4.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
162. Id.
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 702.
164. Two notable exceptions are a 1983 article by Professor Joan Fitzpatrick, formerly Joan
F. Hartman, supra note 19, and a 1988 article by Professor David Weissbrodt, supra note 19.
Professor Fitzpatrick’s article primarily highlighted the difficulties and uncertainties associated
with a customary international law argument, although it ultimately expressed support for such
an argument. In an article written many years later, Professor Fitzpatrick discussed at length the
question, “Is There Any Customary International Law Relating to the Judicial Death Penalty?”
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary International Law Norms to the Death Penalty in
the United States, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 168–77 (1995-96).
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Assuming I am right about the proper time period, or even if it
should be set somewhat earlier, the United States can make a strong
argument that it was a persistent objector prior to the formation of
the purported customary international law rule. Indeed, as I explain,
the United States’ argument becomes seriously problematic only if
the purported rule of customary international law formed prior to the
late 1970s.
2. 1940s–1970s. The story begins in the late 1940s, with the
drafting of the Fourth Geneva Convention. As noted in Part II, this
Convention was designed to provide additional protection to “pro-
tected persons” (civilians and other noncombatants) during time of
armed conflict or military occupation.165 Article 68 of the Convention
was in part a response to the many death sentences carried out during
World War II against inhabitants of occupied territories.166 Article 68
therefore allows imposition of the death penalty on protected persons
only for cases of espionage, serious acts of sabotage, and intentional
offenses causing death, and only “provided that such offenses were
punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force
before the occupation began.”167 The final clause of Article 68 further
states that “the death penalty may not be pronounced against a pro-
tected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the
offence.”168
A draft of this Convention was considered and amended at an
International Red Cross Conference in Stockholm during the summer
of 1948.169 The juvenile death penalty provision was inserted during
that conference at the request of the International Union for Child
Welfare.170 The subsequent drafting history of the Fourth Geneva
Convention shows little discussion of the juvenile death penalty pro-
vision. This Convention was assigned to “Committee III” of the 1949
Geneva Conference. During the committee negotiations in May 1949,
a representative of the United States stated that “[t]he abolition of
the death penalty in the case of protected persons under 18 years of
165. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
166. CLAUDE PILLOUD, RESERVATIONS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 41–42
(1976).
167. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 121, art. 68, cl. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3560, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 330.
168. Id. cl. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3560, 75 U.N.T.S. at 330.
169. COMMENTARY ON IV GENEVA CONVENTION 346–47 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
170. Id.
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age . . . was a matter which called for very careful consideration be-
fore such a sweeping provision was adopted.”171 In the same meeting,
a representative of Italy stated that the “age-limit mentioned in the
third paragraph should be reduced from 18 to 16 years.”172 At that
point, the article containing the juvenile death penalty provision was
sent back to a drafting committee. The International Union for Child
Welfare later sent a letter to Committee III stating that “[w]e would
strongly urge that the prohibition of the death penalty in the case of a
protected person under 18 years of age be maintained.”173 In a subse-
quent meeting in July 1949, the juvenile death penalty portion of the
article was agreed to unanimously by the Committee III delegates
without discussion.174 After discussion of other aspects of Article 68 at
a plenary meeting in August 1949, the entire article was approved.175
The Fourth Geneva Convention was first submitted to the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent in the early 1950s, and the United States
ratified the treaty in 1955.176 Like a number of other nations, the
United States conditioned its consent to the treaty on a reservation to
Article 68. Specifically, it reserved the right “to impose the death
penalty in accordance with the provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2,
without regard to whether the offences referred to therein are pun-
ishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time
the occupation begins.”177 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
explained that this reservation was necessary to protect U.S. forces
against the activities of illegal combatants, and that, without the res-
ervation, an enemy that was about to have its territory occupied
might quickly repeal its death penalty laws, “thus opening the way to
all kinds of subversive activities against the occupant which would not
be punishable by death.”178 The United States did not attach a reser-
171. 2(A) FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (BERNE), FINAL RECORD OF THE
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 673 [hereinafter FINAL RECORD]. The ju-
venile death penalty provision was contained in “Article 59” of the draft considered by the
Committee. When the Convention was finalized, that article became Article 68.
172. Id. at 674.
173. 3 id. at 131.
174. See 2(A) id. at 768. The discussion instead focused on the crimes for which the death
penalty could be imposed and on whether the death penalty for these crimes had to be author-
ized under the law of the occupied territory. Id. at 766–68, 788–90.
175. 2(B) id. at 440–41.
176. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 122.
177. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 121, 6 U.S.T. 3660, 75 U.N.T.S. 432.
178. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON EXECUTIVES D, E, F, AND
G, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 9, at 23 (1955). The United States had attached a similar reservation when
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vation, however, with respect to the juvenile death penalty provision.
Indeed, there is no mention of that provision in the message of the
president conveying the treaty to the Senate, the report on the treaty
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or the Senate hearings.
While the Fourth Geneva Convention does not by its terms apply
to the domestic use of the death penalty, some commentators have
suggested that the United States’ willingness to go along with a ban
on the juvenile death penalty in the extreme situation of wartime sug-
gests an acceptance of a more general ban on this penalty.179 There is
no direct evidence to support this suggestion, and there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. In particular, the United States continued to
sentence juvenile offenders to death after ratifying the Convention.180
Moreover, in the years following U.S. ratification of the Convention,
the Convention was not invoked, domestically or internationally, to
challenge the U.S. practice. Finally, in this time period, it was not
thought that multilateral treaties like this one could generate custom-
ary international law obligations, either as to nonparties or as to prac-
tices not addressed by the treaty—a proposition that has received
widespread support only recently.181 In a similar situation today, the
United States might attach a precautionary reservation to guard
against this sort of customary international law claim, but it had no
reason to do so in 1955.
By the early 1950s, efforts were underway to draft what became
the ICCPR. A general ban on juvenile executions was proposed in the
third round of the treaty negotiations, which took place in 1957. The
it signed the Convention in 1949. See I FINAL RECORD, supra note 171, at 346 (“The United
States reserve the right to impose the death penalty . . . without regard to whether the offences
referred to therein are punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time
the occupation begins.”).
179. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 155, at 358 (“As a matter of logic, it would seem anoma-
lous at best for any state party—thus any state in the world—to continue to execute during
peacetime those under eighteen years of age when such state has joined all states in recognizing
and accepting the illegality of doing so during the demands and exigencies of war.”).
180. See Streib, supra note 23, at 630 (documenting seventeen executions of juvenile offend-
ers from 1950 to 1959 as well as four executions of juvenile offenders in the early 1960s).
181. There was a mild suggestion along these lines in the International Court of Justice’s
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf decision, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 102
reporters’ note 5 (stating that an international agreement may only serve as evidence of codifi-
cation of certain rules, but may not be conclusive on the parties to the agreement), but that was
still many years after U.S. ratification of the Fourth Geneva Convention. For additional discus-
sion of how the conception of customary international has changed in recent years, see infra
notes 258–59 and accompanying text; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Inter-
national Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 838–42 (1997).
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United States abstained from this round of negotiation because, at
that time, it had no intention of ratifying the ICCPR.182 As a result,
the United States “expressed no views on the substance of the
[ICCPR’s] death penalty limitations.”183 This issue arose during the
tail end of the Bricker Amendment debates over whether to amend
the Constitution to limit the treaty power, and the Eisenhower ad-
ministration had promised the Senate that it would not seek ratifica-
tion of any of the major human rights treaties, including the ICCPR.184
A final draft of the ICCPR was completed in 1966, and the treaty
took effect in 1976, all without formal U.S. involvement. The United
States did sign the ICCPR in 1977, but President Jimmy Carter
quickly followed this signature with proposed conditions on the U.S.
ratification, including a condition declining to agree to the juvenile
death penalty provision.185
In the meantime, the United States was involved in the drafting
of the American Convention on Human Rights, a regional treaty in-
volving countries in the Western Hemisphere. The treaty was com-
pleted in 1970 and entered into force in 1978. This treaty, like the
ICCPR, contains a provision prohibiting the execution of juvenile of-
fenders. In a report on the treaty negotiations, the U.S. delegation
stated that the juvenile death penalty provision had been the subject
of “considerable debate,” and that the U.S. delegation had tried, un-
successfully, to have the provision deleted from the draft.186 In earlier
written observations on a draft of the Convention, the U.S. delegation
stated that the juvenile death penalty provision should be deleted be-
cause it “presents various difficulties in law, and fails to take account
of the general trend, already apparent, for the gradual abolition of the
182. See U.N. GAOR Cd. Comm., 12th Sess., 812th mtg. ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.812
(1957) (statement of George Meany) (explaining that “[a]s the United States Government did
not intend to ratify the Covenants, the United States delegation would abstain from voting and
did not intend to participate in the debate”).
183. Id.
184. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 98, 122 (2000).
185. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining
to Human Rights, S. Exec. Docs. C, D, E, and F, 95-2, at iii-iv (1978) [hereinafter Message from
the President].
186. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN
CONFERENCE ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (1969) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE U.S.
DELEGATION], reprinted in 3 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supp. 15
(Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1982).
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death penalty. For this reason, we believe the text will be stronger
and more effective if this paragraph is deleted.”187
Several commentators have seized on this reference to a “general
trend . . . for the gradual abolition of the death penalty” to argue that
the U.S. delegation simply believed that the juvenile death penalty
provision was unnecessary, not that it was objectionable.188 This con-
struction, however, is undermined by the other statements made by
the U.S. delegation, such as its reference to the “substantial debate”
over the provision and the “difficulties in law” posed by the provision.
In context, the comment about gradual abolition seems merely to
have been a tactful effort to make the U.S. objection more palatable
to the other delegates.189
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the U.S. delegation
ultimately abstained from voting on the article containing the juvenile
death penalty provision. While noting that the article did not violate
the U.S. Constitution, the delegation observed that the article did
conflict with some federal legislation, which would mean that, to rat-
ify the treaty, the United States “would apparently have to modify the
federal legislation or make reservations to the article.”190 Importantly,
in explaining why it did not go further in opposing the juvenile death
penalty provision, the delegation stated that, in its view, the provision
would not apply to state death penalty laws in the United States. The
Convention contains a broad federalism clause pursuant to which
federal nations are obligated to implement the Convention only to
the extent that their national governments exercise legislative and ju-
dicial jurisdiction over the subject matter,191 and the delegation rea-
187. OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT INTER-AMERICAN
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 141, 152 (1969), reprinted in 2 HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 186, supp. 13.
188. E.g., de la Vega & Brown, supra note 19, at 758; Nanda, supra note 19, at 1329;
Schabas, supra note 64, at 305; see also Weissbrodt, supra note 19, at 369 (describing the U.S.
statement as “supporting the development of a norm abolishing the death penalty”).
189. The United States later made this clear in a Memorandum it submitted to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. See Memorandum of the United States to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in Case 9647, at 10, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (explaining that it had “offered a policy argument for
deleting the article which appealed to known sentiments of other delegates”).
190. REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, supra note 186, at 19.
191. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 126, art. 28(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at
152.
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soned that the U.S. national government “does not exercise legisla-
tive and judicial jurisdiction” over state criminal punishment.192
In sum, the record from the late 1940s through the mid-1970s is
mainly one of silence and abstention by the United States with re-
spect to the international legality of the juvenile death penalty. The
United States did not give express consent to an international law ban
on the juvenile death penalty during this period, but it also did not
strenuously object to such a ban. Importantly, however, there were
essentially no claims being made in this period that customary inter-
national law prohibited the execution of juvenile offenders. The focus
of the international community, rather, was on developing treaties on
this subject, and the United States carefully avoided ratifying any
such treaty provisions.
3. Late 1970s–Present. In late 1977, the Carter administration
submitted four human rights treaties, including the ICCPR and the
American Convention on Human Rights, to the Senate for its advice
and consent. Anticipating likely senatorial concerns and objections,
the administration proposed that the Senate attach various reserva-
tions to its advice and consent. Some of these reservations were spe-
cifically focused on the juvenile death penalty. For example, the ad-
ministration noted that U.S. law was not entirely in accord with
Article 6 of the ICCPR, which contains a prohibition on juvenile exe-
cutions. It therefore recommended that the Senate adopt the follow-
ing reservation: “The United States reserves the right to impose capi-
tal punishment on any person duly convicted under existing or future
laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment.”193 Similarly,
the administration noted that “[m]any of the provisions of Article 4
[of the American Convention on Human Rights] are not in accord
with United States law and policy, or deal with matters in which the
law is unsettled.”194 The administration suggested, therefore, that the
Senate adopt reservations stating that “United States adherence to
Article 4 is subject to the Constitution and other law of the United
States,” and that the United States “reserves the right in appropriate
192. REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, supra note 186, at 20. See also Memorandum of
the United States to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 189, at 11
(“The presence of the federal clause thus vitiates any argument for reliance on Article 4(5) as a
standard that the United States might be obligated to adopt and enforce with respect to individ-
ual states . . . .”).
193. Message from the President, supra note 185, at xii.
194. Id. at xviii.
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cases to subject minors to procedures and penalties applicable to
adults.”195
During the 1979 hearings on these treaties, there was little dis-
cussion of the reservations relating to the juvenile death penalty. The
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights did submit ob-
jections to those and many other reservations, but its objections to the
juvenile death penalty reservations were very brief, simply asserting
that the reservations would allow the execution of “pregnant women,
or children under 18,” and thereby would “make the United States’
position seem ridiculous.”196 Importantly, neither the Committee nor
anyone else in the hearings suggested that the execution of juvenile
offenders would violate customary international law.
In response to the Lawyers Committee’s criticism of the juvenile
death penalty reservation, the State Department explained that “[t]he
purpose of that reservation, like the other reservations, is to avoid the
assumption of an international obligation to meet certain standards
which U.S. domestic law does not currently meet. Its purpose was cer-
tainly not the preservation of any right to execute children or preg-
nant women, something never done in the United States.”197 Some
commentators have cited this statement as an inaccurate assertion by
the State Department that the United States does not execute juve-
nile offenders.198 This seems unlikely. Presumably the State Depart-
ment, and everyone else in the hearings, was fully aware that many
states allowed for the imposition of the death penalty on offenders
under the age of eighteen. Instead, the State Department probably
was responding to the concern expressed by the Lawyers Committee
that the U.S. reservation did not contain a minimum age requirement,
and thus would, in theory, allow the United States to execute even
young children. As the State Department noted, the execution of such
children, like the execution of pregnant women, is “never done” by
the United States in modern times. Indeed, the execution of young
195. Id. Although not directly relevant to the persistent objector issue, the administration
also proposed that the Senate declare all of the substantive terms of these treaties to be non-
self-executing.
196. International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 50 (1979). It also noted that an effort to preserve future laws that might be
enacted would go beyond even the stated intent of the reservations of not changing existing
practice, and that acceptance of the death penalty provision without reservation “would have
very little effect on current United States practice.” Id.
197. Id. at 55.
198. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 164, at 174; Hartman, supra note 19, at 685.
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children presumably would raise serious Eighth Amendment con-
cerns. Consistent with this reading of the State Department’s state-
ment, the reservation that was ultimately adopted by the United
States stated that the United States was reserving the right, “subject to
its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any
person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing
or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, in-
cluding such punishment for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age.”199 These qualifications thus made clear that the
United States was reserving the right to impose the death penalty on
individuals who commit their offenses while under the age of eight-
een, not a right to impose the death penalty on young children (or
pregnant women).200 Notwithstanding the proposed reservations, the
United States did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992 (and it still has not
ratified the American Convention).
In the meantime, a case arose before an international organiza-
tion that directly challenged the legality of the U.S. juvenile death
penalty. In 1985 and 1986, two juvenile offenders on death row—one
in South Carolina and the other in Texas—brought complaints before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.201 The petitioners
argued that the imposition of the death penalty on them would vio-
late several provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, a resolution adopted by a group of American states,
including the United States, in 1949.202 The Declaration does not men-
199. U.S. RUDs, supra note 67, at 8070 (emphasis added).
200. Some commentators have subsequently criticized this reservation on the ground that it
relies on unstated “constitutional constraints” rather than a specified minimum age, and thus
leaves open the possibility of executing very young children. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (2d ed. 1997); Louis
Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 341, 344 & n.13 (1995).
201. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights was created in 1959 and held its first session in 1960.
Among other things, the Commission visits member countries, observes their human rights
practices, and issues country-specific reports. Since 1965, it also has been authorized to receive
petitions and complaints regarding specific cases of human rights violations in the member
countries. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, What is the IACHR?, at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is different from the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. See supra note 108.
202. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, at 7, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/ser.L./V./I.4, rev. XX (1948)
BRADLEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 04/14/03 1:54 PM
528 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:485
tion the death penalty, but it does refer to a “right to life”203 and a
right against “cruel, infamous or unusual punishment.”204 The peti-
tioners argued that these rights, “as informed by customary interna-
tional law,” are violated by the execution of juvenile offenders.205 Al-
though the Declaration was not originally established as a binding
treaty, the Commission has asserted that it became binding on the
United States when it ratified a Protocol to the OAS Charter in
1968.206 The U.S. government has stated, however, that it “categori-
cally rejects” this proposition.207
In its briefs to the Commission, the U.S. State Department de-
nied that the American Declaration, even as informed by customary
203. Id. art. 1, at 2.
204. Id. art. 26, at 7.
205. Case 9647, 147, 148, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
Although the Commission asked both the U.S. State Department and the respective state gov-
ernors to stay the executions while the Commission considered the case, both of the petitioners
were executed while their complaints were pending. The State Department informed the Com-
mission that, under the U.S. federal system, there were no domestic legal grounds for Executive
Branch intervention in these death sentences. Id. at 149–50. In this respect, this case is similar to
two recent cases in which U.S. states have carried out executions of foreign citizens notwith-
standing preliminary orders by the International Court of Justice stating that the United States
was to “take all measures at its disposal” to stay the executions. Federal Republic of Germany v.
United States, 526 U.S. 111, 113 (1999); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998). For a dis-
cussion of the Breard case, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution,
and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999).
206. See Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, 38 OEA/ser.L./V./II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1, (1981). The
Commission’s reasoning on this point was not spelled out in any detail. In an article written be-
fore the decision, Professor (now ICJ Judge) Buergenthal set forth a complicated argument re-
garding why the Declaration should be binding. The article noted, among other things, that Ar-
ticle 112 of the Protocol gave the Commission the “principal function” of promoting “the
observance and protection of human rights,” and of serving as “a consultative organ of the Or-
ganization in human rights matters”; Article 150 of the Protocol stated that, “[u]ntil the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights . . . enters into force, this Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights shall keep vigilance over the observance of human rights”; and Article 2 of
the Statute of the Inter-American Commission provided that, “[f]or purposes of the present
Statute, human rights are understood to be . . . . [t]he rights set forth in the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, in relation to the other member states.” Thomas Buergen-
thal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 834
(1975). The United States disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion in Case 2141 that the
Declaration was binding. Memorandum of the United States to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights in Case 9647, supra note 189, at 6–7 & n.6.
207. Case 11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 570, 583 OEA/ser.L./V./II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998). For a
useful overview of all the death penalty litigation against the United States in the Inter-
American human rights system, see generally Richard J. Wilson, The United States’ Position on
the Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159
(2002).
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international law, prohibited the execution of juvenile offenders.208
The State Department pointed out that the age of majority for im-
posing the death penalty was not, at that time, a matter of uniform na-
tional practice.209 The Department also denied that there was the req-
uisite “sense of international legal obligation” to create a customary
international law rule on this issue.210 In the alternative, the Depart-
ment argued that, even if customary international law did contain a
prohibition on juvenile executions, the United States had opted out of
such a prohibition through its persistent objection.211 It noted, for ex-
ample, that the United States had declined to participate in the dis-
cussions concerning the provision on juvenile executions in the
ICCPR, and that it ultimately submitted the ICCPR to the Senate
with a proposed reservation to that provision.212 It also noted that the
United States had opposed the ban on juvenile executions in the
American Convention, and that this treaty, too, had been submitted
to the Senate with a proposed reservation to the juvenile death pen-
alty provision.213 The Department concluded its brief by stating that
“[t]here is no basis in international law for applying to the United
States a standard taken from treaties to which it is not a party and
that it has indicated it will not accept when it becomes a party.”214
In early 1987, while this case was pending before the Commis-
sion, the State Department transmitted a memorandum to all its dip-
lomatic posts, in which the Department further made clear that the
United States did not agree to any international law restriction on the
juvenile death penalty.215 In addition to noting that the United States
had not agreed to any treaty restrictions on juvenile executions, the
State Department stated as follows:
[I]t is the view of the United States that customary international law
does not establish the age of eighteen as a rigid cutoff for the impo-
sition of the death penalty. Although many countries do prohibit the
208. Memorandum of the United States to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in Case 9647, at 3–7, 14–19, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987).
209. Id. at 15, 16–17.
210. Id. at 15.
211. Id. at 17–19.
212. Id. at 17–18.
213. Id. at 18.
214. Id. at 18–19.
215. I CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981–1988, at
875–77 (1993).
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execution of under-eighteen offenders, the practice of these states
falls short of the requirements necessary to create a norm of cus-
tomary international law. First, the practice is not uniform; a num-
ber of states, including the United States, allow the execution of un-
der-eighteen offenders. Second, there is no evidence that states
prohibit the execution of under-eighteen offenders out of a sense of
legal obligation. Without this element of “opinio juris,” state prac-
tice is inconclusive as to the existence of a norm of customary inter-
national law.216
Importantly, the Inter-American Commission agreed with the
United States on these points.217 The Commission stated that, while a
customary international law ban on juvenile executions “is emerg-
ing,” the Commission was “convinced by the U.S. Government’s ar-
gument that there does not now exist a norm of customary interna-
tional law establishing 18 to be the minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty.”218 In addition, citing the proposed U.S. reservations to
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Commission stated
that, “[s]ince the United States has protested the norm, it would not
be applicable to the United States should it be held to exist.”219 Thus,
the United States was found, as of 1987, not to be bound by any cus-
tomary international law ban on the juvenile death penalty.220
216. Id. at 876.
217. Case 9647, 147, 165 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
218. Id. at 172. The Commission did express the view that, among the member states to the
OAS, there was a “regional jus cogens” norm against the “execution of children.” Id. at 168–70.
It did not hold, however, that this norm categorically prohibited the execution of any offender
under the age of eighteen. For criticism of the Commission’s notion of “regional jus cogens,”
see, for example, Donald T. Fox, Current Development: Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights Finds United States in Violation, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 601–02 (1988) (“Unfortunately,
the Commission did not elaborate on the notion of a regional jus cogens, or compare it to the
notion of peremptory norm stated in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention . . . .”); WEISSBRODT
ET AL., supra note 11, at 720–21 (describing criticism of the Commission’s reasoning). For addi-
tional discussion of jus cogens arguments against the juvenile death penalty, see infra Part III.C.
219. Case 9647, 147, 168, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
220. Despite agreeing with the United States on these points, the Commission held against
the United States on the ground that the diversity of capital punishment standards throughout
the United States “results in the arbitrary deprivation of life and inequality before the law,” in
violation of Articles I and II of the American Declaration. Id. at 173. One member of the Com-
mission dissented from this part of the Commission’s decision, arguing, among other things, that
the United States had not consented to any treaty or customary international law limitation on
its execution of juvenile offenders. Id. at 176–80 (Cabra, Del., dissenting). The U.S. government
also strongly objected to the Commission’s conclusion in a request for reconsideration, arguing
that the conclusion represented a “fundamental misconception of the right to equality before
the law as set forth in the Declaration,” Request for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 3/87, at
155, 163, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), and that
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Shortly after the Inter-American Commission’s decision, in 1988
and 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the legality of the juve-
nile death penalty under U.S. constitutional law, in the Thompson
and Stanford decisions. As explained in Part I, the Court ultimately
concluded that there was no Eighth Amendment ban on the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders at least sixteen years of age.221 The Court
also made clear that it was reaching this conclusion notwithstanding
contrary international practice.222
At about this time, the United States was involved in negotia-
tions over the text of the proposed Convention on the Rights of the
Child. During these negotiations, the U.S. delegation objected to the
proposed ban in the Convention on juvenile executions but stated
that it would not insist on deletion of that provision “provided it was
understood that the United States maintained its right to make a res-
ervation on this point.”223 The first President Bush refused even to
sign this Convention, in part because of its death penalty provision.224
The Clinton administration did sign the Convention in 1995, but
President Clinton also stated at that time that he would ask the Sen-
ate to attach “a number of reservations and understandings” to “pro-
tect the rights of the various states under the nation’s federal system
of government and maintain the country’s ability to use existing tools
“[t]he United States has assumed no international obligation to alter in any way its constitu-
tional structure of government,” id. Even critics of the juvenile death penalty have questioned
the Commission’s decision on this point as insensitive to the United States’ federal structure.
See, e.g., Weissbrodt, supra note 19, at 360–61 (stating that “this broad holding is impractical, if
not absurd, with respect to United States law”).
221. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
223. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO
THE “TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES” 465 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992); see also id. at 475 (“In join-
ing the consensus the representative of the United States of America reserved the right of his
country to enter reservations on this article if ever the United States of America decided to rat-
ify the Convention.”); Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the
Child, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 42d Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 24, Doc.
E/CN.4/1986/39 (1986); Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the
Child, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 45th Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 101, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1989/48.
224. Timothy J. McNulty, U.S. Out in Cold, Won’t Sign Pact on Children, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
30, 1990, at 4C.
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of the criminal justice system in appropriate cases.”225 The United
States still has not ratified the Convention.
The United States finally ratified the ICCPR in 1992. It did so
subject to a variety of reservations, including a reservation declining
to agree to a ban on juvenile executions. The Bush administration ex-
plained that:
in light of the recent reaffirmation of U.S. policy towards capital
punishment generally, and in particular the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions upholding state laws permitting the death penalty for crimes
committed by juveniles aged 16 and 17, the prohibition against im-
position of capital punishment for crimes committed by minors is
not acceptable.226
The reservation was adopted despite suggestions by several human
rights groups during the 1991 hearings that the juvenile death penalty
violated international law.227
After ratifying the ICCPR, the United States found itself de-
fending the legality of its reservations to that treaty. As discussed in
Part II, the monitoring committee established under the ICCPR is-
sued reports in 1994 and 1995 critical of the U.S. reservations.228
Among other things, the committee suggested that the U.S. reserva-
tion on the juvenile death penalty violated international law stan-
dards governing permissible reservations. The U.S. State Department
strongly objected to this conclusion, stating, among other things, that
“while many are opposed to the death penalty in general and the ju-
venile death penalty in particular, the practice of States demonstrates
that there is currently no blanket prohibition in customary interna-
tional law.”229 The State Department also explained that the United
States had decided to leave the legality of the death penalty, including
225. Press Release, White House Press Office, Statement on U.N. Decision to Sign U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Feb. 10, 1995). See also David P. Stewart, Ratification of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 172–82 (1998)
(discussing domestic issues implicated by the Convention and potential reservations).
226. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 10 (1991).
227. See id. at 38, 95 (statement of Carole Nagengast, Chair, Amnesty International USA);
id. at 145 (statement of Charles D. Siegal, Chair, Human Rights Committee of the International
Law Association—American Branch); id. at 152 (statement of the Minnesota Lawyers Interna-
tional Human Rights Committee); id. at 182 (statement of Human Rights Watch).
228. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
229. U.S. Response, supra note 111, at 267.
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the juvenile death penalty, to its domestic democratic processes.230 It
further “disagreed that customary international law established a
clear prohibition at the age of 18.”231 Finally, the State Department
argued that the trend among nations to abolish the juvenile death
penalty did not make the U.S. approach unlawful:
We understand that capital punishment has been abolished or se-
verely limited in many countries in the world. In the United States,
there is a continuing debate over this issue, including dispute over
provisions which permit courts to treat juveniles as adults in certain
limited situations. Current U.S. law reflects the democratically-
expressed will of the American people. Our Supreme Court has up-
held its constitutionality. Capital punishment is not prohibited by
the Covenant or, more generally, by international law.232
It is at about this point in the story—the mid-1990s—that official
international organizations began suggesting that the U.S. juvenile
death penalty violated international law. For example, in addition to
the reports described in Part II from the ICCPR’s human rights
committee, the UN Human Rights Commission has issued resolutions
every year since 1997 concerning the death penalty. These resolu-
tions, among other things, urge all States that still maintain the death
penalty
to comply fully with their obligations under the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, notably not to impose the death penalty . . . for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . . .233
230. Summary Record, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg. at 5, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (statement of Conrad Harper).
231. Id.
232. USUN Press Release No. 49-(95), United States Mission to the United Nations, State-
ment by Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to the Human Rights Commit-
tee at its Fifty-third Session at the United Nations on U.S. Implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 5 (Mar. 29, 1995).
233. The Question of the Death Penalty, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 2002/77, U.N. GAOR, 58th
Sess., ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77 (2002); The Question of the Death Penalty, Hum.
Rts. Comm. Res. 2001/68, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68
(2001); The Question of the Death Penalty, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 2000/65, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (2000); The Question of the Death Penalty, Hum.
Rts. Comm. Res. 1999/61, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61
(1999); The Question of the Death Penalty, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1998/8, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/8 (1998); The Question of the Death Penalty, Hum. Rts.
Comm. Res. 1997/12, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/12 (1997).
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The wording of these resolutions can be read as suggesting that all na-
tions are obligated to end this practice by virtue of existing treaties—
even nations that have declined to ratify these treaties or have ratified
them subject to reservations. Similarly, the UN’s Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions began asserting
in late 1996, and the UN’s Subcommission on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights began asserting in 1999, that international
law prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders.234 Prior UN state-
ments, dating back to the 1980s, had urged abolition of the juvenile
death penalty on policy grounds but had not asserted that abolition
was required by international law.235
One of the most recent developments in the story is the Domin-
gues case mentioned at the beginning of this Article.236 In opposing
Supreme Court review in that case, the Solicitor General argued that
the United States was not obligated by treaty to end the execution of
juvenile offenders.237 He also explained that “[t]he United States has
234. See Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part
of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and Territo-
ries ¶ 88, E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996) (“Capital punishment is prohibited for juvenile offenders under
international law.”); The Death Penalty in Relation to Juvenile Offenders, Sub-Comm’n on the
Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts. Res. 2000/17, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/17 (2000), http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.
CN.4.SUB.2.RES.2000.17.En?Opendocument (recommending that the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights pass a resolution which “confirms that international law concerning the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in relation to juveniles clearly establishes that the . . . [juvenile death
penalty] is in contravention of customary international law”); The Death Penalty, Particularly in
Relation to Juvenile Offenders, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts.
Res. 1999/4, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1999/4 (1999), http://www.unhr.ch
/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.1999.4.En?Opendocument (calling upon
all States to abolish the death penalty for juvenile offenders and noting that “abolition of the
death penalty [would] contribute[] to the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive
development of human rights”).
235. For example, in 1984, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights issued a set of
safeguards for protection of those facing the death penalty, which was adopted by a resolution
of the Economic and Social Council. The third safeguard states that “[p]ersons below 18 years
of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced to death.” Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50,
U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1984). Similarly, in a 1985
resolution the U.N. General Assembly adopted a set of Standard Minimum Rules for the Ad-
ministration of Juvenile Justice (known as the “Beijing Rules”), one provision of which states
that capital punishment shall not be imposed for crimes committed by juveniles. G.A. Res.
40/33, U.N. GAOR., 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 210, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985). See generally
WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 11, at 714–17 (describing nontreaty instruments that prohibit
juvenile executions).
236. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
237. Domingues Brief, supra note 16, at 4–11.
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in the past taken the position in international fora that customary in-
ternational law does not prohibit the execution of sixteen-year-old of-
fenders. The United States has also persistently objected to the de-
velopment and application of such a principle.”238 Among other
things, the Solicitor General cited the U.S. statements before the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights in the mid-1980s.239
4. Summary. The record thus shows that, at least since the late
1970s, the United States has declined to agree to treaty provisions
that would outlaw the execution of juvenile offenders, has repeatedly
stated before international bodies (such as the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights and the ICCPR’s Human Rights Commit-
tee) that it objects to an international law ban on the practice, and has
continued to allow for the execution of juvenile offenders domesti-
cally in the face of international pressure to end the practice. The re-
cord also shows that, as international criticism of the juvenile death
penalty has increased, and as treaties have been developed to prohibit
this practice, the U.S. reservation of a right to continue the practice
has become more pronounced. Under conventional international law
analysis, this record should be sufficient to demonstrate that the
United States is a persistent objector.
C. Reliance on the Concept of Jus Cogens
As discussed, the United States can and does argue that it has
opted out of any customary international law ban on the juvenile
death penalty. Increasingly, critics of the juvenile death penalty are
responding by arguing that the United States is disallowed from opt-
ing out because the prohibition on juvenile executions is now a jus
cogens norm. A jus cogens norm (also called a “peremptory norm”)
is, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general in-
ternational law having the same character.”240 These norms purport-
238. Id. at 15.
239. Id. at 15 n.8.
240. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344;
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus cogens as “[a] mandatory
norm of general international law from which no two or more nations may exempt themselves
or release one another”). A number of U.S. courts have recited the Vienna Convention’s defini-
tion of jus cogens. See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149–50
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edly transcend requirements of national consent, such that nations are
not allowed to opt out of them, even by treaty. Norms frequently de-
scribed as jus cogens norms are the prohibitions (now contained in
treaties) on the aggressive use of force, genocide, slavery, and tor-
ture.241
Critics of the juvenile death penalty point to the widespread rati-
fication of treaties prohibiting juvenile executions and the almost
worldwide halt in executing juvenile offenders as “proof” that the
prohibition on executing juvenile offenders has attained the status of
a jus cogens norm. The following argument from a recent article is il-
lustrative:
The death penalty is disappearing throughout the world. Only in a
few countries, including the United States, does the death penalty
still have a safe haven. Even fewer countries still execute defendants
who committed crimes when under the age of eighteen. Thus, the
prohibition of the juvenile death penalty is not only customary in-
ternational law, but also jus cogens, and a norm to which the rene-
gade United States should be bound.242
If accepted, this argument would allow opponents of the juvenile
death penalty to avoid the usual consent-based restrictions associated
with claims based on treaties and customary international law.
As an initial matter, one can reasonably question whether jus co-
gens is meaningful as a legal (as opposed to moral) concept. Although
there is widespread agreement on the jus cogens concept in the ab-
stract, there is no agreement on either the process by which jus cogens
norms are formed or the content of these norms.243 The Vienna Con-
vention does not address these fundamental questions because the
treaty delegates could not agree on how to resolve them,244 which at
least raises the question whether the jus cogens concept is anything
(7th Cir. 2001); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992);
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 102 reporters’ note 6; id. § 702 cmt. n.
242. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 19, at 770.
243. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 109, at 257 (“There is no agreement on the criteria for iden-
tifying which norms of general international law have a peremptory character.”); BROWNLIE,
supra note 148, at 516–17 (“[M]ore authority exists for the category of jus cogens than exists for
its particular content.”); I.A. SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1994) (“[T]here is
a lack of consensus as to what, at the present time, are norms of jus cogens.”).
244. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 58 (7th rev. ed. 1997); Christopher A. Ford, Adjudicating Jus Cogens, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J.
145, 165–66 (1994).
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other than, in the words of one commentator, a “normative myth
masking power arrangements.”245 Nor is it clear that the concept is
compatible with the current structure of the international community,
which, despite aspirations in some academic circles to the contrary, is
still dominated by sovereign nation-states.246 For example, although
the jus cogens concept is often analogized to public policy limitations
imposed by domestic legal systems on freedom of contract, the anal-
ogy is imperfect at best because, unlike in domestic systems, there is
no hierarchically superior sovereign in the international legal sys-
tem.247
To be sure, the concept of jus cogens is endorsed in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Conceptually, however, it may be
difficult to justify the nonconsensual doctrine of jus cogens from the
consensual act of ratifying the Vienna Convention. In any event, only
about 90 nations—less than one-half of all nations—are parties to the
Vienna Convention, and the United States is not one of them.
Moreover, the Vienna Convention invokes the concept of jus cogens
only as a rule concerning the validity of treaties, not as a limitation on
nontreaty conduct.248 In retaining a juvenile death penalty, however,
the United States is not attempting to enforce any treaty. By its terms,
therefore, the Vienna Convention is not directly relevant to this situa-
tion.
Even if one accepts that jus cogens is a meaningful and binding
legal concept, and that it applies outside the context of treaty en-
forcement, there are still significant justifications for resisting the ar-
gument that the prohibition on executing juvenile offenders is a jus
cogens norm. As a normative matter, it may be difficult to justify the
placement of capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
245. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International
Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 590 (1988); see also Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane,
It’s Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1990) (noting critically that “the sheer ephemerality of
jus cogens is an asset, enabling any writer to christen any ordinary norm of his or her choice as a
new jus cogens norm, thereby in one stroke investing it with magical power”).
246. See generally Mark L. Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083, 1089–94 (1996) (providing evidence to show that
“the decline of the nation state has been greatly exaggerated”).
247. For additional criticism of the public policy analogy, see A. Mark Weisburd, The Emp-
tiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 25–27 (1995).
248. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, arts. 53, 64, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 344, 347 (stating simply that treaty provisions that conflict with peremptory norms
are void).
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murderers in the same category as genocide, slavery, and torture. In-
deed, there is a danger that the “shock the conscience” nature of the
jus cogens concept will be undermined by expanding the category in
this way. Although this observation obviously depends to some extent
on a subjective assessment, the behavior of nations appears to bear it
out. For example, unlike the case of certain jus cogens violations—
such as genocide and war crimes—there has not been any
international effort to prosecute officials who carry out the execution
of juvenile offenders.249
Furthermore, the purported ban on the execution of juvenile of-
fenders may not have the absolute character usually associated with
jus cogens norms. Unlike the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and
torture, the purported prohibition on the execution of juvenile of-
fenders is limited and qualified. It does not, for example, rule out the
use of capital punishment in general. Nor could it do so, given that
almost one-half of all nations (including large nations like China and
the United States) still have the death penalty, and only a relatively
small number of nations have ratified treaties prohibiting this prac-
tice.250 Moreover, the purported ban on the juvenile death penalty
does not even apply to the execution of all youthful offenders, or
even all teenagers—just the execution of individuals who happen to
be under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense. And the age
of eighteen is a rather arbitrary dividing line, as suggested by ongoing
debates in the medical and scientific communities about the age of
maturity, and by the use of varying age requirements for other issues
relating to maturity (such as driving, selective service, use of the juve-
nile justice system, statutory rape, and consumption of alcohol).
249. The treaty establishing the proposed International Criminal Court limits the Court’s
jurisdiction to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 71, art. 5(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1003–04.
250. There are several treaties that call for a complete end to the death penalty, none of
which the United States has signed or ratified: the Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which has forty-nine parties), United Nations
Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapter
IV/treaty22.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); the Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (which has nine par-
ties), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic8.
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); and Protocol No. Six to the
European Convention on Human Rights (which has forty-one parties), Treaty Office, Council
of Europe, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2003)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). For a description of international practices concerning the
death penalty, see generally ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE
PERSPECTIVE (rev. ed. 1996).
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Finally, one point frequently emphasized by courts and commen-
tators in concluding that certain norms are within the category of jus
cogens is that no nation claims the right to engage in the behavior.
Some nations may in fact violate the purported jus cogens norm, but
they typically deny having done so, or promise not to do so in the fu-
ture. Under such circumstances, one could conclude that a norm has
been, to use the language of the Vienna Convention, “accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole.”251
For example, in concluding in the famous Filartiga decision that cus-
tomary international law prohibits torture, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit emphasized that the court had “been directed
to no assertion by any contemporary state of a right to torture its own
or another nation’s citizens.”252 By contrast, the United States consis-
tently has maintained that it does have the right to carry out juvenile
executions, and it has not attempted to hide or stop this practice.253
For all these reasons, the jus cogens challenge to the juvenile death
penalty seems unpersuasive.254
251. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 70, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344
(emphasis added).
252. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
253. Some commentators have claimed that South Africa’s apartheid regime violated jus
cogens norms against racial discrimination, notwithstanding South Africa’s insistence on the
right to retain this regime. E.g., HENKIN, supra note 70, at 39. Assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that this claim is correct, it still may be unlikely for a jus cogens norm to form when a large
and influential nation like the United States is a persistent objector. For example, the UN Secu-
rity Council—the only organ of the UN with lawmaking power—passed a number of resolutions
condemning apartheid and sanctioning South Africa. The United States, by contrast, has veto
power on the Council and thus, as a practical matter, will not have its conduct subjected to such
resolutions. In any event, the South Africa example may not have involved persistent objection,
since South Africa had agreed to equal racial treatment in its ratification of the United Nations
Charter. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public
International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 119 (Part V 1982). But see Jonathan I. Charney,
Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 539–40 n.48 (1993) (“[I]t is difficult to sus-
tain the argument that the Government of South Africa ever knowingly consented to the estab-
lishment of legal obligations under the Charter or general international law making its discrimi-
natory laws illegal.”).
254. In its 1987 decision the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that there
was a “regional jus cogens” norm against executing “children.” See supra note 218. The Com-
mission did not take the position that such a norm prohibited the execution of any offender un-
der the age of eighteen. Moreover, the Commission’s jus cogens statement is highly question-
able, both because jus cogens norms are supposed to be universal, not regional, and because the
jus cogens statement appears to contradict the Commission’s own finding that there was no cus-
tomary international law prohibition on juvenile executions. See also Case 9647, 147, 181, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (Cabra, Del., dissenting) (stating that
“there can be no ‘American jus cogens’”); cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 70, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344 (stating that a jus cogens norm is “accepted by the interna-
BRADLEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 04/14/03 1:54 PM
540 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:485
IV.  ENFORCEMENT IN U.S. COURTS
As I have explained, neither treaties nor customary international
law provide strong arguments against the U.S. juvenile death penalty,
at least as a matter of conventional international law analysis. To the
extent there is uncertainty about this conclusion, it is largely due to
efforts to reduce or eliminate traditional international law require-
ments of national consent. There are efforts, for example, to disallow
treaty reservations, even if accepted by the other parties to the treaty;
to sever invalid reservations and bind the reserving country to the
treaty as if it had never entered the reservation; to derive customary
international law from treaties and then apply it to countries that
have not ratified the treaties; to restrict or eliminate the persistent
objector exception to customary international law; and to broaden the
jus cogens category.
These efforts have not been universally applauded, even from
scholars otherwise supportive of international law. For example, Pro-
fessor Prosper Weil in his well-known article, Towards Relative Nor-
mativity in International Law?, argued that the “legal” nature of in-
ternational law was being undermined by the erosion of state consent
requirements.255 As Professor Weil explained:
[T]he intention manifested by a state in regard to a given convention
is henceforth of little account: whether it signs it or not, becomes
party to it or not, enters reservations to such and such a clause or
not, it will in any case be bound by any provisions of the convention
that are recognized to possess the character of rules of customary or
general international law.256
This phenomenon is a threat to the legitimacy of international law, he
argued, because “[a]bsent voluntarism, international law would no
longer be performing its functions.”257 Other scholars, such as Profes-
tional community as a whole” (emphasis added)). Recently, in October 2002, the Commission
concluded that “a norm of international customary law has emerged prohibiting the execution
of offenders under the age of 18 years at the time of their crime” and that “this rule has been
recognized as being of a sufficiently indelible nature to now constitute a norm of jus cogens.”
Report No. 62/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Domingues v. United States ¶¶ 84-85 (Oct. 22, 2002). For
the reasons in the text, I disagree with the Commission’s conclusion.
255. See generally Weil, supra note 143, at 438–40.
256. Id. at 440.
257. Id. at 420. The two principal functions of international law, he argued, are: “first, to en-
able these heterogeneous and equal states to live side by side, and to that end to establish or-
derly and, as far as possible, peaceful relations among them; second, to cater to the common
interests that did not take long to surface over and above the diversity of states.” Id. at 418.
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sors Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, have expressed particular con-
cern with respect to customary international law. Observing that cus-
tomary international law traditionally had been determined induc-
tively from state practice, Simma and Alston noted with concern that
such an approach was being discarded in favor of an approach that
focused more on international statements, such as those contained in
nonbinding United Nations resolutions, turning customary interna-
tional law into “a self-contained exercise in rhetoric.”258 More dra-
matically, Professor Patrick Kelly argued in a 2000 article that cus-
tomary international law has become too indeterminate and
manipulable and, as a result, “should be eliminated as a source of in-
ternational legal norms and replaced by consensual processes.”259
Even if these criticisms are overcome, and the efforts to make in-
ternational law less dependent on national consent are successful, it is
unlikely that the international law arguments would provide a basis
for judicial invalidation of state death penalty laws in U.S. courts. In-
deed, if anything, an erosion of national consent requirements is
likely to reduce the likelihood that U.S. courts will enforce interna-
tional law in this way.
A. Enforcing the ICCPR
As I discuss in Part II, in order for an ICCPR-based challenge
against the U.S. juvenile death penalty to succeed under international
law, a decisionmaker would have to reach two questionable conclu-
sions: that the U.S. reservation violates the object and purpose of the
ICCPR, and that the proper remedy under international law is to
sever the reservation and enforce the treaty against the United States
as if it had never entered the reservation.260 Even those conclusions,
however, would probably be insufficient to provide a U.S. court with a
basis for disregarding the reservation.
258. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Co-
gens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1988–89); see also Schabas, supra
note 64, at 309 (“The problem of such wishful thinking among human rights jurists, who invoke
ill-defined ‘custom’ as a substitute for serious and sometimes frustrating efforts at treaty inter-
pretation, is not a new one.”).
259. Kelly, supra note 138, at 452. For additional criticism of customary international law,
see generally Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 138; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Under-
standing the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40
VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (2000).
260. See supra Part II.A.
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Article II of the Constitution specifies the procedural require-
ments for treatymaking: the president has the power to make treaties,
“by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.”261 The reservations to the
ICCPR, including the reservation to the juvenile death penalty provi-
sion, comply with these requirements. The president and at least two-
thirds of the senators present accepted these reservations, and they
were included with the U.S. instrument of treaty ratification that was
deposited by the president with the United Nations.262 Furthermore,
there does not appear to be any basis in U.S. law for imposing on this
process any additional limitations derived from the customary inter-
national law of treaty reservations. Although the Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue directly, it has long held that Congress is not
required under U.S. law to comply with treaties,263 and the lower
courts uniformly have held that Congress is not required to comply
with customary international law.264 Furthermore, lower courts gener-
ally have held that the executive branch is not required to comply
with customary international law.265 There is no reason to believe that
U.S. law imposes a requirement of international law compliance on
the Senate and president when making treaties when it does not im-
pose this requirement on Congress or the president outside the treaty
process. Consequently, even if a U.S. court accepted the international
law arguments, it would not have a basis under U.S. law for disre-
garding the U.S. reservation.266
In fact, enforcement of the juvenile death penalty provision by a
U.S. court would not only lack support in U.S. law, it arguably would
261. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
262. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 69, at 439–56 (discussing customary international
law principles of treaty formation in relation to the separation of powers).
263. Under the “last-in-time” rule, when there is a conflict between a federal statute and an
earlier-in-time treaty, U.S. courts will apply the statute. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376
(1998); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600
(1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
264. E.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yunis, 924
F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453–54 (11th Cir. 1986).
265. E.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447–48 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1454–55; see also
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that courts are to apply the law of na-
tions “where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci-
sion”).
266. Cf. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (“The treaty is therefore a law
made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any
of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States.”).
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violate the U.S. Constitution. Under Articles II and VI of the Consti-
tution, the president and two-thirds of the Senate must agree on the
terms of a treaty before it becomes part of the “supreme Law of the
Land.” If a U.S. court disregarded the U.S. reservation and enforced
the juvenile death penalty provision, it would be treating as supreme
law of the land a treaty provision that had never been approved by
the president and Senate. Even if one were to conclude that the
proper international law remedy was to sever the reservation and en-
force the treaty as if the reservation had never been entered, the pro-
cedural requirements of the Constitution would remain unsatisfied.
This is true even if a court somehow concluded that the U.S. treaty-
makers would have ratified the treaty without the reservation if they
had known that the reservation was invalid under international law,
since Article II refers to what the treatymakers actually agreed upon,
not to what they would have agreed upon.267
More generally, courts would likely be reluctant to disregard the
U.S. reservation because doing so would involve a substantial judicial
intervention into the treaty process. U.S. courts have never exercised
judicial review to invalidate either the domestic or international ef-
fects of a treaty. In part, this is because the text of the Constitution is
relatively silent about the scope and exclusivity of the treaty power.
U.S. courts also have recognized that, although treaties are legal in-
struments, their creation and especially their enforcement are heavily
informed by political factors.268 Recognizing the lack of textual guid-
ance and the importance of political contingency in this context, U.S.
courts have taken a largely passive role in the institutional develop-
ments concerning the making and enforcement of treaties. They usu-
ally defer to the accommodations of the political branches (such as
267. This situation can be contrasted with the usual statutory severability situation, where
the issue is whether to enforce a statute without the severed term or not at all, not whether to en-
force a provision that Congress refused to put into the statute. For additional discussion of sev-
erability, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 888–89 (3d ed. 2001); Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes
and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41 (1995); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV.
203 (1993).
268. See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“A treaty is
primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provi-
sions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.”).
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the allowance of congressional-executive agreements)269 or abstain
from adjudicating disputes between the political branches (such as
over the termination of treaties).270 Similarly, they consider many mat-
ters pertaining to the negotiation, observance, and status of treaties to
be “political questions” committed to the discretion of the political
branches.271 They also give “great weight” to the Executive Branch’s
interpretation of a treaty.272 And, of course, judicial deference to po-
litical branch arrangements is especially strong in situations, as with
the reservations to the ICCPR, in which the political branches are in
agreement.273 For all of these reasons, it is highly unlikely that a U.S.
court would apply the customary international law of treaty reserva-
tions to invalidate the United States’ juvenile death penalty reserva-
tion to the ICCPR.
B. Non-Self-Execution
Another barrier to domestic enforcement of the ICCPR is that
the president and Senate attached a declaration to their ratification of
this treaty stating that the substantive provisions of the treaty are
“not self-executing.”274 Under U.S. law, if a treaty is not self-
executing, it cannot be enforced in U.S. courts unless and until Con-
gress enacts legislation implementing the treaty.275 As a result, the
269. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1311–14 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the constitutionality of the NAFTA trade agreement was a political question);
Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1999) (allowing extradition pursuant to con-
gressional-executive agreement).
270. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (declining to decide the validity of
President Carter’s unilateral termination of defense treaty with Taiwan).
271. Edwin D. Dickinson, International Political Questions in the National Courts, 19 AM.
INT’L L. 157, 158–163 (1925).
272. E.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 326(2); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference
and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 701–07 (2000) (discussing this phenomenon).
273. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (“When the President acts pur-
suant to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers but
also those delegated by Congress. In such a case the executive action ‘would be supported by
the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden
of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.’”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
274. See U.S. RUDs, supra note 67, at 8071.
275. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (stating that if a treaty is not
self-executing, “the legislature must execute the [treaty], before it can become a rule for the
Court”); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875–76 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); Jama v. INS, 22 F.
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ICCPR’s provision concerning the juvenile death penalty, even if
binding on the United States, cannot be applied by U.S. courts to in-
validate state death penalty laws.
Some commentators have suggested that the non-self-execution
declaration should be disregarded by U.S. courts because it conflicts
with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which states in rele-
vant part that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.”276 According to these commentators, the Supremacy Clause
mandates that treaties have the status of preemptive federal law, and
the U.S. treatymakers therefore do not have the unilateral power to
prevent treaties from having that status. As Professor Henkin states,
“treaties are declared to be the supreme law of the land . . . . [I]t
should not require legislative implementation to convert [a treaty]
into United States law.”277 Henkin concludes that the “pattern of non-
self-executing declarations [attached to human rights treaties] threat-
ens to subvert the constitutional treaty system.”278
Although the word “shall” in the Supremacy Clause gives this
argument surface plausibility, the argument becomes doubtful once
one considers the purposes of the Supremacy Clause and its well-
settled application outside the reservations context. By its terms, the
Clause obviously does make federal laws supreme over state laws.
The Clause does not, however, purport to affect the power of U.S.
lawmakers to define the domestic scope of the laws they enact, either
as to the states or as to other federal laws. In other words, the Clause
does not, as critics of the U.S. reservations suggest, operate as a limit
on federal lawmaking power.
Three examples illustrate this point. First, the Supremacy Clause
makes federal statutes, like treaties, the supreme law of the land.
Nonetheless, Congress frequently specifies that federal statutes do
not preempt state law, do not invalidate prior federal law, or do not
Supp. 2d 353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998) (“‘Non-self-executing’ means that absent any further actions by
the Congress to incorporate them into domestic law, the courts may not enforce them.”).
276. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
277. Henkin, supra note 200, at 346.
278. Id. at 348.
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create a private cause of action.279 Second, although congressional-
executive agreements—which are equivalent to treaties under inter-
national law—are considered part of the supreme law of the land, it is
widely accepted that Congress and the president can limit the self-
executing effect of these agreements.280 Third, and most directly rele-
vant, it has long been settled that, notwithstanding the Supremacy
Clause, not all treaties are self-executing.281
With respect to the last point, critics of the non-self-execution
declaration generally concede that not all treaties are self-executing.
They argue, however, that the self-execution issue must be resolved
solely by reference to the terms of the treaty negotiated with foreign
nations, not by conditions unilaterally imposed on the treaty by the
Senate or president.282 Nothing in the language of the Supremacy
Clause or in U.S. historical tradition suggests that this is true. As
noted, federal lawmakers generally have the power to limit the do-
mestic effects of their enactments, and there is no reason to believe
that the treatymakers should have less power in this regard.
In any event, even if it were true that the issue of self-execution
had to be determined solely by reference to the terms of the treaty,
the United States’ non-self-execution declarations are in fact part of
the terms of the treaties. They are included with the U.S. instrument
of ratification that defines the nature of the U.S. obligations to other
countries, and all other parties to the treaties are on notice of them.
279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7) (2000) (“Nothing in this subsection [concerning asylum appli-
cations] shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally
enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other per-
son.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2649(a) (2000) (“Nothing in this subchapter [relating to removal of asbestos]
shall be construed, interpreted, or applied to preempt, displace, or supplant any other State or
Federal law, whether statutory or common.”).
280. E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217
(2d ed. 1996); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-
Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 525–26 (1991); Stefan
A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion
and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 641 (1991). For example, in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, which authorizes the latest GATT agreement, Congress stated that:
“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provi-
sion to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall
have effect.” Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994). Congress also stated
that no one other than the United States “shall have any cause of action or defense under any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements” or challenge “any action or inaction . . . of the United States,
any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is
inconsistent” with one of the agreements. Id. § 102(c)(1), 108 Stat. at 4818.
281. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 280, at 296–97.
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Moreover, unlike some of the United States’ substantive reservations,
no nation has specifically objected to the non-self-execution declara-
tions. It would be difficult for any nation to do so, since many nations’
constitutions render all treaties non-self-executing, and require sepa-
rate implementing legislation for the treaties to have domestic force.
Thus, even if the treatymakers could control the domestic scope of a
treaty only by including limitations within the treaty itself, that is pre-
cisely what the non-self-execution declarations accomplish.
Critics of the non-self-execution declarations sometimes quote
from early historical materials to the effect that the inclusion of trea-
ties in the Supremacy Clause was designed to reduce treaty violations
attributable to the United States. They argue that non-self-execution
declarations may contravene this purpose by heightening the risk that
the United States will violate international law.283 None of this histori-
cal evidence, however, suggests that the Supremacy Clause was meant
to limit the treatymakers’ control over the domestic force of treaties.
Rather, it shows only that the Founders were concerned about treaty
violations by the states, and that they wished to give the national gov-
ernment the power to prevent treaty violations if they so desired. The
inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause, in other words, was de-
signed to enhance the ability of the federal government to compel
state compliance with treaties, not to restrict the federal government’s
flexibility in determining whether and how to comply with interna-
tional law.284
Another argument made by some commentators is that, even if
valid, the ICCPR’s non-self-execution declaration merely precludes a
private cause of action under the treaty, not defensive use of the
treaty, such as use of the treaty in a criminal proceeding as a defense
283. E.g., Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 49,
60–62 (1997); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 716–17 (1995).
284. For extensive documentation of this point, see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Con-
stitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955
(1999); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-
Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999); see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 24–25 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (citing Edmund Randolph’s observation
that, under the Articles of Confederation, “[i]f a State acts against a foreign power contrary to
the laws of nations or violates a treaty, [the federal government] cannot punish that State, or
compel its obedience to the treaty”). For an explanation of why the non-self-execution declara-
tion does not exceed the scope of the treaty power, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 69, at
449–54.
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to the imposition of capital punishment.285 As noted, the judicially de-
veloped concept of non-self-execution has traditionally been thought
to preclude all uses of a treaty in court, both offensive and defen-
sive.286 There is no evidence that the president and Senate intended to
deviate from this traditional understanding in attaching the non-self-
execution declaration to the ICCPR. Although there are statements
in the ICCPR’s legislative history explaining that the non-self-
execution declaration would preclude a private cause of action,287
there are no statements supporting the negative inference that defen-
sive uses of the treaty would be allowed. Indeed, there are a number
of statements expressly stating that the ICCPR would not be judi-
cially enforceable at all in the absence of implementing legislation.288
This is also how courts have interpreted the declaration.289
C. Object and Purpose of Unratified Treaties
It seems even less likely that a state death penalty law could suc-
cessfully be challenged on the basis of the “object and purpose” of a
treaty that the United States has signed but not ratified, such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child or the American Convention
on Human Rights. Under Article VI of the Constitution, only “Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States” are part of the supreme law of the land that preempts incon-
sistent state law.290 Article II of the Constitution makes clear, how-
ever, that a treaty is not “made” until the Senate gives its advice and
consent, and the president proceeds to ratify it.291 Thus, a treaty that
has been signed but not ratified by the United States does not have
preemptive force under the Constitution.
Although it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized the
authority of the president to conclude binding international agree-
285. E.g., John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in U.S. Courts, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 555, 579–
88 (1998); David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 197–219 (1999).
286. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
287. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 69, at 420–21.
288. Id. at 421–22.
289. Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337,
372 (6th Cir. 2001); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267–68 (5th Cir. 2001).
290. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
291. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the president “shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur”).
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ments on his own authority under certain circumstances,292 presidents
have not attempted to use this “sole executive agreement” power to
conclude any human rights treaty, let alone any treaty relating to the
juvenile death penalty. Nor has any president claimed that the United
States is legally bound to stop the execution of juvenile offenders. In-
deed, presidents have consistently proposed reservations to make
clear that the United States is not under this obligation.293
Moreover, if a president did claim that the United States was
bound to stop the execution of juvenile offenders by virtue of a presi-
dential signature of a human rights treaty, the claim would likely pro-
voke substantial constitutional debate. The Senate almost certainly
would perceive such a claim to be an infringement of its constitutional
role in the treaty process.294 In addition, there probably would be fed-
eralism objections to such a claim, since the juvenile death penalty is
a feature of state criminal punishment, and the states are not formally
represented in the executive branch. In light of these constitutional
concerns, a court would likely treat such an object and purpose obli-
gation as, at best, non-self-executing.295
292. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
293. See supra notes 194–95, 223–25, and accompanying text.
294. The Senate has resisted presidential efforts to expand the executive agreement power.
For example, in giving its advice and consent to the 1991 Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces
in Europe, the Senate attached a declaration stating that international agreements that “reduce
or limit the armed forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner”
can be approved only pursuant to the Article II treaty process. 137 CONG. REC. 34,348 (1991).
Recently, in response to a suggestion by President Bush that he might conclude an arms reduc-
tion pact with Russia by means of an executive agreement, leaders of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee wrote a letter to the president insisting that any such agreement be concluded
pursuant to the Article II senatorial consent process. See Letter from Jesse Helms, Ranking
Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, http://www.
armscontrolcenter.org/2002summit/a7.html (Mar. 15, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
295. Both the political branches and the courts have long assumed that the Constitution’s
distribution of federal powers is relevant to the self-execution analysis. Thus, for example, treaty
provisions calling for the appropriation of money have been treated as non-self-executing in or-
der to preserve Congress’s constitutional authority over appropriations. Edwards v. Carter, 580
F.2d 1055, 1058–59 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Similarly, treaties modifying tariff duties have generally
been treated as non-self-executing in order to preserve the House of Representatives’ role in
raising revenue. See id. at 1077 n.15 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (“‘Congress has often insisted
that treaties modifying tariffs are not self-executing and require congressional implementa-
tion . . . .” (citation omitted)). And, for separation of powers and federalism reasons, U.S. courts
typically treat the decisions and orders of international institutions as non-self-executing. See,
e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998) (declining to enforce a preliminary order of the
International Court of Justice); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (declining to enforce a final decision of the International Court of Jus-
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D. Status of Customary International Law
For customary international law to provide a basis for judicial in-
validation of state death penalty laws, it would need to have the status
of preemptive federal law. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
states that there are three types of supreme federal law: the Constitu-
tion, treaties, and “Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance
[of the Constitution].”296 Customary international law is obviously not
the Constitution; nor is it a treaty. It was referred to at the time of the
constitutional Founding as a component of the “law of nations,” yet
the Constitution’s only reference to the law of nations is a grant of
power to Congress “[t]o define and punish . . . Offenses against the
Law of Nations.”297 While the Supreme Court has at times referred to
the law of nations as “part of our law,”298 or “part of the law of the
land,”299 it has never suggested that customary international law is
part of the “Laws of the United States” referred to in the Supremacy
Clause. And it seems inconceivable that the Founders of the Consti-
tution would have viewed customary international law as “made in
Pursuance” of the Constitution. Instead, they likely would have un-
derstood this law as stemming from either natural law or the customs
of the international community.300
Most scholars now agree that, before Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins,301 customary international law had the status in the United States
of general common law rather than supreme federal law. That is, cus-
tomary international law, like the “law merchant” applied in Swift v.
Tyson,302 was part of a body of law that could be applied by courts as a
rule of decision in the absence of controlling positive law to the con-
trary. This general common law did not preempt state statutory law,
tice); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (declining to enforce a Security
Council resolution). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing this
phenomenon).
296. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
297. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
298. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
299. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
300. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 630
(2002); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 822–24, 832–33 (1989).
301. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
302. 41 U.S. (14 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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and cases arising under this law did not by that fact alone fall within
Article III federal question jurisdiction.303
The Court in Erie famously declared that “[t]here is no federal
general common law,” and that, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the State.”304 This holding might suggest that
federal courts should look to state law when applying customary in-
ternational law. Indeed, in Bergman v. De Sieyes,305 the Second Circuit
reached precisely that conclusion. In an opinion authored by Judge
Learned Hand, the court examined New York state law to determine
the customary international law immunity of a diplomat in transit,
noting that “although the courts of [New York] look to international
law as a source of New York law, their interpretation of international
law is controlling upon us, and we are to follow them so far as they
have declared themselves.”306
Nevertheless, since Erie, the Supreme Court has allowed for the
creation of discrete bodies of federal common law.307 Unlike general
common law, federal common law is supreme federal law binding on
the states, and cases arising under it are viewed as falling within Arti-
cle III federal question jurisdiction. In recent years, many scholars,
and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, have maintained that customary international law
should be treated as (or like) post-Erie federal common law.308
303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, at 41; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common
Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1276–85 (1996); Jay, supra note
300, at 824–25; see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S.
Courts—Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807, 813–14 (1998) (documenting
this point).
304. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
305. 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
306. Id. at 361. The court also stated, however, that “[w]hether an avowed refusal to accept
a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would present
a federal question we need not consider, for neither is present here.” Id.
307. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 349–84 (3d ed. 1999);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 413–24 (6th ed.
2002).
308. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, at 42; Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State
Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 342–43;
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1569
(1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824,
1824–27 (1998).
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Even outside the context of the juvenile death penalty, there are
substantial reasons to question this federal common law argument.309
Although the Supreme Court has not given clear guidance about the
conditions under which it is appropriate to create federal common
law, the logic of Erie arguably requires that federal common law, to
be legitimate, must be authorized in some fashion by either the U.S.
Constitution or a federal statute.310 It is difficult to argue, however,
that anything in the Constitution or federal statutory law authorizes
the wholesale judicial federalization of customary international law.
In addition, although a national approach to customary international
law might seem desirable from a policy perspective due to concerns
about state disuniformity, the Supreme Court has emphasized in re-
cent decisions that federal common law exists only in “few and re-
stricted” instances, and that it will not be recognized merely because
of a purported need for uniformity.311 The Court further has empha-
sized that it is generally for Congress, not the federal courts, to de-
termine when state law should be displaced.312
While a number of lower federal courts have stated in recent
years that customary international law has the status of federal com-
mon law, they have done so exclusively in the context of adjudicating
human rights claims between foreign citizens, and exclusively for the
purpose of establishing federal court jurisdiction over the suits.313
When faced with customary international law claims in domestic
cases, courts have almost always rejected them.314 Furthermore, there
309. For a more thorough discussion of these reasons, see generally Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 181.
310. E.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 883, 887 (1986); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE
L. REV. 263, 287 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985).
311. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 651 (1963)).
312. Id. The Supreme Court’s restrictive approach in recent years to implied statutory rights
of action, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88 (2001), and implied rights of action
under the Constitution, e.g., Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–70 (2001),
further suggests that the Court will require congressional authorization for the displacement of
state law.
313. Eg., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502–03 (9th Cir. 1992); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995); cf.
Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1153 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting the
“present uncertainty about the precise domestic role of customary international law”).
314. Outside of the death penalty context, see, for example, Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp.
2d 27, 42 (D. Mass. 1999); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1245 (C.D. Cal.
BRADLEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 04/14/03 1:54 PM
2002] JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 553
are essentially no cases in which courts have relied on customary in-
ternational law to preempt a state law.315
In any event, regardless of the general status of customary inter-
national law in U.S. courts, there are special separation of powers and
federalism reasons for concluding that customary international law
does not operate to preempt state law with respect to the juvenile
death penalty. First, the U.S. treatymakers have expressly declined to
allow the preemption of state laws in this area, by adopting reserva-
tions refusing to consent to a restriction of the juvenile death penalty,
and by declaring the relevant treaties to be non-self-executing. Given
these actions by the federal political branches, it would be highly
problematic for courts to apply international law as preemptive fed-
eral law, especially since much of the evidence of the purported cus-
tomary international law on this issue is the widespread treaty prac-
tice. Federal common law, after all, is supposed to promote, not
undermine, the policy choices made by the political branches.316
Second, the Supreme Court has held that criminal law and pun-
ishment is an area particularly within the sovereign authority of the
states.317 Preemption of state law with respect to the juvenile death
penalty thus poses special federalism concerns. Even if Congress or
the treatymakers have the constitutional power to preempt the states
on this issue, this would not make it appropriate for courts to do so on
their own. Courts do not have general legislative power, which was
assigned in Article I of the Constitution to Congress, rather than to
the judiciary. Nor do states have the structural representation in the
1999); and White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998). See generally Bradley,
supra note 22 (noting the differences in results of international human rights litigation in U.S.
courts depending on whether the defendants are aliens or U.S. citizens).
315. I am aware of only one decision in U.S. history in which a court arguably applied cus-
tomary international law to override a state law. In Republic of Argentina v. City of New York,
250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969), the New York Court of Appeals held that the City of New York
could not assess taxes against Argentina’s consulate property because the assessment would
violate customary international law. Id. at 704. The court never explained its views about the
precise status of customary international law, but the court might have implicitly been accepting
Argentina’s argument that customary international law had the status of preemptive federal
law.
316. See, e.g., D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (observing that “[f]ederal common law implements the federal Constitution and stat-
utes, and is conditioned by them” (emphasis added)).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress
lacked power to provide a civil remedy for gender-motivated crimes of violence); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566–68 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked power to criminalize pos-
session of firearms near schools).
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federal courts that they have in Congress.318 Not surprisingly, there-
fore, courts have so far declined to apply customary international law
to preempt state death penalty laws.319
This conclusion should not change even if the purported custom-
ary international law prohibition against the juvenile death penalty
has attained the status of a jus cogens norm. Although international
law may distinguish between ordinary customary international law
and jus cogens norms, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution or
federal statutory law that makes this distinction, and the distinction
has not typically affected the willingness of U.S. courts to adjudicate
claims. Thus, for example, courts have rejected the argument that
there is a special exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act for jus cogens claims.320 Conversely, courts have held that the
Alien Tort Statute is not limited to jus cogens claims.321 As one might
expect, therefore, courts that have rejected customary international
law challenges to the juvenile death penalty also have rejected jus co-
gens challenges.322
E. Charming Betsy Canon
Relief is also unlikely to be available under the “Charming
Betsy” canon of construction. This canon, named after an early Su-
preme Court decision, Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,323
holds that, if possible, federal statutes should be construed so that
they do not violate international law.324 Although the precise justifica-
318. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981) (noting that “the
States are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts”).
319. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 373–74 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Even if we were to
conclude that the abolition of the death penalty was a customary norm of international law or
rose to the higher level of being a peremptory norm or jus cogens, we do not believe that this
would be a sufficient basis for our court to invalidate Ohio’s death penalty statute.”).
320. Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1156 (7th Cir. 2001); Smith v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1996); Princz v. Federal
Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1991).
321. E.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2001). The
Alien Tort Statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
322. E.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002); Buell, 274 F.3d at 374.
323. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
324. Id. The precise strength of the canon is uncertain. In Charming Betsy, the Court stated
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains.” Id. For a somewhat softer description of the canon, see
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tions for this canon are unclear, it is a fairly well-settled feature of
U.S. law.325
This canon is not directly relevant to the juvenile death penalty
issue. The canon applies to the construction of federal statutes, but
federal law does not provide for the execution of juvenile offenders.
Despite suggestions to the contrary by one scholar,326 states are
probably not required to apply the canon in construing their own
statutory law. If, as is commonly assumed, the canon is designed to re-
flect likely congressional intent, it is difficult to see how it is relevant
to the intent of a state legislature. Similarly, if the canon is conceived
of as a separation of powers limitation concerning the relationship be-
tween the federal courts and the federal political branches, as courts
have sometimes suggested, it would not seem to govern the relation-
ship between state courts and state legislatures.327 Not surprisingly,
there are no reported decisions in which state courts have applied the
canon, and there are no federal court decisions ordering them to do
so.
Even if the canon did apply to state statutes, it would apply only
when the state statute was susceptible to a construction that would
avoid the purported violation of international law. Most of the state
death penalty laws at issue, however, clearly allow for the execution
of juvenile offenders. Thus, there does not appear to be any room for
the canon to influence the construction of these statutes.
Some scholars have argued that the canon should be applied to
the construction of the U.S. Constitution.328 There is no direct prece-
dent for applying the canon in this way, and the typical justifications
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 114 (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is
to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of
the United States.” (emphasis added)); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon
and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J.
479, 490–91 (1998) (discussing the strength of the canon).
325. See generally Bradley, supra note 324; Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International
Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990). For a re-
cent decision invoking the canon, see Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff’d and amended after remand, Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1115–16 (9th Cir.
2001).
326. Steinhardt, supra note 325, at 1113–14 n.45.
327. For additional discussion of these points, see generally Bradley, supra note 324, at 533–
36.
328. E.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 36 (1983); Fitzpatrick, supra note 164, at 179;
Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights
Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1987).
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for the canon—such as generalizations about likely congressional in-
tent—would not seem to apply to the Constitution. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,329 could also be read as an
implicit rejection of the Charming Betsy canon in the context of the
Eighth Amendment.
Furthermore, in considering the role of the canon in this context,
it is important to remember that the Eighth Amendment, even as cur-
rently construed, does not require the juvenile death penalty. To the
extent that juvenile offenders are executed in the United States, it is
not because such executions are prescribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment, but rather because they are prescribed by state death penalty
statutes. Thus, even if customary international law prohibits the exe-
cution of juvenile offenders, the Eighth Amendment, as currently
construed, does not violate this prohibition. International law, after
all, does not require the embodiment of international law proscrip-
tions in national constitutions.330 As a result, the Charming Betsy
canon—which is designed to avoid the construction of enactments
that would place the United States in violation of international law—
does not appear to provide a basis for relief with respect to the juve-
nile death penalty.331
CONCLUSION
The juvenile death penalty is shaping up to be one of the central
testing grounds for the enforcement of international human rights law
in U.S. courts. Among other things, this practice implicates the valid-
ity of the United States’ reservations to human rights treaties, the
ability of the United States to “opt out” of emerging customary inter-
national law norms, and the status of international law in the U.S. le-
329. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
160–61 (4th ed. 2001) (“International law requires a state to carry out its international obliga-
tions but, in general, how a state accomplishes that result is not of concern to international law
or to the state system.”).
331. Cf. Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1152–55 (7th Cir. 2001)
(declining to construe the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as allowing suits against foreign
sovereigns to the extent permitted by international law because this construction was not neces-
sary to avoid a violation of international law). As I note in Part I, one could still argue that in-
ternational practice should be considered in determining whether a criminal punishment is
“cruel and unusual” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Although a majority of the Su-
preme Court rejected reliance on such evidence in Stanford v. Kentucky, a new majority was
somewhat more receptive to such evidence in the recent Atkins decision concerning execution
of the mentally retarded. See supra note 63.
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gal system. Given the large number of countries that have abandoned
the juvenile death penalty, it is understandable that litigants, advo-
cacy groups, and scholars are increasingly focusing their attention on
this practice.
Despite the widespread international criticism of the juvenile
death penalty, the international law arguments against it have signifi-
cant weaknesses. The United States has carefully avoided consenting
to treaty provisions that prohibit the juvenile death penalty. It also
has persistently objected to claims that it is bound by customary in-
ternational law to end this practice. While jus cogens claims concern-
ing the juvenile death penalty are by their nature more difficult to
evaluate, there are a number of reasons to conclude that the jus co-
gens concept does not apply in this context. In addition, even if these
international law arguments were more persuasive, it is unlikely that
they would provide a basis for relief in U.S. courts.
I do not intend to suggest in this Article that the juvenile death
penalty reflects wise policy or that it should be retained. Nor am I ar-
guing that international practice is irrelevant to this policy question,
or even to the Eighth Amendment analysis of what is cruel and un-
usual. My argument, rather, is that these policy and legal questions
must ultimately be decided by the United States, in accordance with
its constitutional processes. Claims by advocacy groups and scholars
that these decisions have already been made for the United States
distort the actual requirements of international law and, in any event,
are not likely to be persuasive to U.S. decisionmakers.
